This text consists of replies to commentaries by Michael Williams, Duncan Pritchard and Javier González de Prado on my book Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology (Springer, 2018).
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On the editing of On Certainty and its place in Wittgenstein’s corpus, namely its relationship with the Philosophical Investigations, see Venturinha (2010).
Wittgenstein’s wavy underline in the manuscript, which expresses his dissatisfaction with the word, is not here represented. The words underlined are “Sicherheit” and “Gewißheit”.
Boncompagni, A. (2016). Wittgenstein and pragmatism: On certainty in the light of Peirce and James. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Boult, C., & Pritchard, D. (2013). Wittgensteinian anti-scepticism and epistemic vertigo. Philosophia, 41, 27–35.
Kant, I. (1992). The Jäsche logic. In Lectures on logic (ed. and trans. J. M. Young) (pp. 517–640). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pritchard, D. (2012). Wittgenstein and the groundlessness of our believing. Synthese, 189, 255–272.
Pritchard, D. (2016). Epistemic angst: Radical skepticism and the groundlessness of our believing. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Pritchard, D. (forthcoming). Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology and deep disagreement. Topoi. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9612-y.
Venturinha, N. (2010). A re-evaluation of the Philosophical investigations. In N. Venturinha (Ed.), Wittgenstein after his Nachlass (pp. 143–156). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Venturinha, N. (2018). Description of situations: An essay in contextualist epistemology. Cham: Springer.
Williams, M. (2018). Wittgenstein and skepticism: Illusory doubts. In D. E. Machuca & B. Reed (Eds.), Skepticism: From antiquity to the present (pp. 481–505). London: Bloomsbury.
Williams, M. (2019). Beyond Unnatural doubts: Lessons from Wittgenstein. In E. Marchesan & D. Zapero (Eds.), Context, truth, and objectivity: Essays on radical contextualism (pp. 59–87). New York: Routledge.
Wittgenstein, L. (1974). On certainty, 2nd edn (ed. G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright; trans. D. Paul & G. E. M. Anscombe). Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (2000). Wittgenstein’s Nachlass: The Bergen electronic edition (ed. The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (2009). Philosophical investigations, 4th edn (ed. P. M. S. Hacker & J. Schulte; trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker & J. Schulte). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
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I am extremely grateful to all my commentators for their attentive reading of my Description of Situations (2018) and for the insightful questions they have raised. I am also very grateful to the editors of Philosophia for their receptivity to this symposium. It is a privilege to think about some central themes of the book from so many different angles. I hope that my replies will be able to do justice to the acute criticism I found in each of the commentaries.
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Venturinha, N. Replies to Commentators. Philosophia 48, 1713–1724 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00153-w
- Disclosure principle
- Epistemic vertigo
- Hinge epistemology