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Replies to Commentators

Abstract

This text consists of replies to commentaries by Michael Williams, Duncan Pritchard and Javier González de Prado on my book Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology (Springer, 2018).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    On the editing of On Certainty and its place in Wittgenstein’s corpus, namely its relationship with the Philosophical Investigations, see Venturinha (2010).

  2. 2.

    Wittgenstein’s wavy underline in the manuscript, which expresses his dissatisfaction with the word, is not here represented. The words underlined are “Sicherheit” and “Gewißheit”.

References

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Correspondence to Nuno Venturinha.

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I am extremely grateful to all my commentators for their attentive reading of my Description of Situations (2018) and for the insightful questions they have raised. I am also very grateful to the editors of Philosophia for their receptivity to this symposium. It is a privilege to think about some central themes of the book from so many different angles. I hope that my replies will be able to do justice to the acute criticism I found in each of the commentaries.

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Venturinha, N. Replies to Commentators. Philosophia 48, 1713–1724 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00153-w

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Keywords

  • Contextualism
  • Disclosure principle
  • Epistemic vertigo
  • Hinge epistemology
  • Scepticism
  • Wittgenstein