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Précis of Description of Situations

Abstract

This précis articulates the main themes of my book Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology (Springer, 2018).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    It should be stressed that I am one of those philosophers who, as Alan Musgrave put it, “first reduce knowledge by acquaintance to know-how” and then argue that “know-how can be reduced to knowledge-that”, thus subscribing to a view according to which “all knowledge is, at bottom, propositional knowledge” (Musgrave 1993: 6–7). The reduction of Rylean “knowing-how” to “knowing-that” was forcefully defended by Stanley and Williamson (2001), and by Stanley (2011), in which a Fregean approach to the nature of propositions plays, as in Description of Situations, a fundamental role.

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Correspondence to Nuno Venturinha.

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Venturinha, N. Précis of Description of Situations. Philosophia 48, 1683–1690 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00152-x

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Keywords

  • Epistemic contextualism
  • Intersubjectivity
  • Knowledge attributions
  • Modality
  • Objectivity
  • Radical scepticism