This précis articulates the main themes of my book Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology (Springer, 2018).
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It should be stressed that I am one of those philosophers who, as Alan Musgrave put it, “first reduce knowledge by acquaintance to know-how” and then argue that “know-how can be reduced to knowledge-that”, thus subscribing to a view according to which “all knowledge is, at bottom, propositional knowledge” (Musgrave 1993: 6–7). The reduction of Rylean “knowing-how” to “knowing-that” was forcefully defended by Stanley and Williamson (2001), and by Stanley (2011), in which a Fregean approach to the nature of propositions plays, as in Description of Situations, a fundamental role.
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Venturinha, N. Précis of Description of Situations. Philosophia 48, 1683–1690 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00152-x
- Epistemic contextualism
- Knowledge attributions
- Radical scepticism