Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn (Eds.), 2018, Epistemic Consequentialism

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 335 pages, $77.00

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Acknowledgements

This review contributes to the research programme of the MTA - BTK - Lendület ‘Morals and Science’ Research Group. My research was supported by the MTA - BTK - Lendület ‘Morals and Science’ Research Project. I am also grateful to Oxford University Press for delivering a copy of the book.

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Correspondence to Peter Hartl.

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Hartl, P. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn (Eds.), 2018, Epistemic Consequentialism. Philosophia 48, 1273–1281 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00127-y

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