Mindreading capacity has been widely understood as the human ability to gain knowledge about the inner processes and states of others that bring about the behavior of these agents. This paper argues against this epistemic view of mindreading on the basis of different empirical studies in linguistics and social and developmental psychology: we are systematically biased in attributing mental states, and many everyday uses of mental ascription sentences do not reflect an epistemic function in our social interactions. We introduce an alternative view of mental ascriptions, the social cover view, which is consistent with the evidence. The social cover view holds that the main function of mental ascriptions is to cover the social status and reputation of an agent rather than to gain knowledge about her inner processes and states. Finally, we discuss two possible objections to our proposal.
This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.
Buy single article
Instant access to the full article PDF.
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.
Subscribe to journal
Immediate online access to all issues from 2019. Subscription will auto renew annually.
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.
To our knowledge, the label “social cover” in the way we use it here was coined by Norman (2016). This label refers to the idea that reasoning mechanisms are used for projecting a positive social image rather than for epistemic purposes. Given that our proposal can be seen as an application of the same idea to mental states attributions, we have decided to keep this label.
Traditionally, there are two groups of theories regarding mindreading. According to the theory-theory, mental state attributions are the result of implicit theorization based on a systematic corpus of general laws specifying the connection between perceptual inputs, internal states and behavioral outputs (Baron-Cohen 1995; Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997; Gopnik & Wellman 1994). According to the simulation-theory, the mindreading process is carried out by different simulation mechanisms based on introspections or off-line sub-personal mechanisms (Goldman 1989; Gordon 19965; Heal, 1998) that exploit the access to our own mental states to project what others would do in a given situation. In later developments, several authors have tried to develop certain hybrid versions involving some combination of the processes. In fact, nowadays there is a common consensus about the existence of both types of mechanisms (Carruthers 2006; Goldman 2006; Nichols & Stich 2003). For the purpose of this paper, we consider both approaches as instances of the epistemic view. Both views presuppose that laypeople tackle social encounters as instances of an epistemic problem.
The central claim of this paper is fully compatible with the pluralist views of social cognition, according to which socio-cognitive skills in general, and mindreading in particular, can exhibit different functions (see Andrews 2012; Fiebich and Coltheart 2015). However, different pluralist views can propose different/various specific hypotheses regarding the role of mindreading and social skills. In this respect, we believe that the arguments and evidence presented in this paper are sufficient to claim that the epistemic function is less frequent in everyday interactions than it has been assumed. Furthermore, as the evidence in developmental psychology suggested in section 5 and 6 indicates, we put forward the idea that the social cover function is developmentally prior to other functions (for a similar point see Fernández Castro 2019).
Although character traits like aggressiveness and trustworthiness can considered mental states, we follow the standard literature which often distinguish between occurrent mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, intentions) and other attributions (e.g., traits, stereotypes). However, it is an open question whether or not the latter must be considered as part of our mindreading capacities or just an influence (see Spaulding 2018, pp. 24–36; Westra 2017b).
See also Hannikainen 2018 (p. 5) for a recent example where participants think they are immune to the effects of the experiment in which they participate.
One may recognize a different role for implicit biases in social interpretation while resisting to abandon the epistemic assumption (Spaulding 2016; Westra 2017b). For instance, Spaulding (2016) argues that social situations impose different needs for accuracy and efficiency, forcing agents to rely on shortcomings and heuristics when the situation demands efficiency, and rely on more reflexive and deliberative processes when accuracy is required. There are two problems with this view. First, it is not so clear that deliberative and reflexive processes are unbiased (Wittenbrink et al. 2001), which would cast into question even a more restricted version of the epistemic view, where accuracy is only needed in some situations. Second, some important evidence supports the idea that stereotypes and implicit bias are not as inaccurate as it is often assumed (see Jussim 2012 for a review), reinforcing the idea that the efficiency of our anticipatory and interpretative capacities may rely on different processes such as stereotypes and character traits, rather than mindreading (Andrews 2012, 2015; Hirschfeld 2013; Kalish 2012; Maibom 2007; Zawidzki 2013; section 4). Of course, taking into consideration this evidence goes beyond the scope of this paper. For our purpose, it is enough to notice that our mindreading capacities are prone to error in a way that accuracy is far from being secured.
Philosophical literature regarding action often distinguishes between intentional actions and mere happenings or passive behavior (see Wilson and Shpall 2016 for a review). For the purpose of our paper, we do not focus on such distinction; instead, we focus on those actions and behavior that the agent is accountable for. In this sense, we use the terms intentional actions and behavior interchangeably.
Although Malle and his colleagues claim that reasons explanation and reasons explanation involving mental vocabulary are mostly the same (they involve psychological causes of the action), there is an important tradition in philosophy that denies that reason explanations are implicit psychological causes. According to these authors, reasons must be construed as facts or propositions that motivate the action (Alvarez 2010; Scanlon 1998). See below.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for bring our attention to this.
It may be objected that, while it is obvious that mental state verbs are being used here, it is unclear that this use says anything about mental states concepts. However, it should be noted that the motivation for the mindreading research in psychology and philosophy was to offer an explanation of how human beings use mental attributions, and therefore how we use them in our linguistic exchanges (see for instance, Perner 1991, pp. 1–11; Stone and Davies 1996, pp. 119–120). If much of the mental vocabulary that we use is not meant to talk about the internal processes of agents, perhaps this is not what we mostly do by attributing mental states. To think that these uses of mental vocabulary do not really refer to mental concepts is to excessively restrict the ‘pure’ phenomenon of mental attributions, which in turn supports our idea that it is not the main function of what we do when we talk about people’s beliefs, desires and other mental states.
Non-factive verbs are verbs used to show that the speaker is not completely committed to the truth of the proposition expressed in the that-clause.
We do not rule out the possibility that there are other related functions. Most importantly, we are not negating that we often speculate about the other inner states with our ascriptions. However, we take these functions to be central and more fundamental.
In this task, a child is exposed to a scenario where a character, Maxi, puts chocolate into a cupboard x. When Maxi is not present, his mother moves the chocolate from x into a cupboard y. In the standard task (Wimmer and Perner 1983), children have to indicate the box where Maxi will look for the chocolate when he returns. Only when the child is able to represent Maxi’s wrong belief, is he able to point correctly to box x.
Some of the studies involving implicit mindreading have recently failed to replicate (e.g., Kulke et al. 2018). Thus, the debate about how to interpret these tasks may therefore turn out to be futile. However, given the importance of the literature discussing these findings in the last ten years and waiting for more conclusive evidence, we believe the objection is still worth discussing.
Westra also targets the 2-systems views (Apperly 2011; Bohl and Bos 2012; Butterfill and Apperly 2013; Wellman 2014), according to which the two types of FB-tasks (implicit and explicit) reflect two systems of mindreading. One inflexible, fast implicit system and one slow, explicit verbally mediated system.
Aijmer, K. (1997). I think: An English modal particle. In T. Swan & O. Westik (Eds.), Modality in Germanic language: Historical and comparative perspectives (pp. 1–48). De Gruyter Mouton.
Alexander, R. D. (1987). The biology of moral systems. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Alvarez, M. (2010). Kinds of reasons: An essay in the philosophy of action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Andrews, K. (2012). Do apes read minds? Toward a new folk psychology. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Andrews, K. (2015). The folk psychological spiral: Explanation, regulation, and language. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 53, 50–67.
Apperly, I. A. (2011). Mindreaders: The cognitive basis of “theory of mind”. New York: Taylor and Francis.
Barclay, P., & Willer, R. (2007). Partner choice creates competitive altruism in humans. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 274, 749–753.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness an Essay on Autism and "Theory of Mind". Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Bartsch, K., & Wellman, H. (1989). Young children’s attribution of action to beliefs and desires. Child Development, 60(4), 946–964.
Bartsch, K., & Wellman, H. (1995). Children talk about the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bergamaschi Ganapini, M. (2019). Confabulating Reasons. Topoi, online first, 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-09629-y
Bermudez, J. L. (2003). The domain of folk psychology. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 53, 25–48.
Bohl, V., & Bos, W. (2012). Toward an integrative account of social cognition: Marrying theory of mind and interactionism to study the interplay of type 1 and type 2 processes. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6, 274.
Brewer, M. B., and Brown, R. J. (1998). Intergroup relations. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (pp. 554-594). New York, NY, US: McGraw-Hill.
Buttelmann, D., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Eighteen-month-old infants show false belief understanding in an active helping paradigm. Cognition, 112(2), 337–342.
Butterfill, S., & Apperly, I. A. (2013). How to construct a minimal theory of mind. Mind & Language, 28(5), 606–637.
Carruthers, P. (2006). The architecture of the mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
Carruthers, P. (2017). Mindreading in adults: Evaluating two-systems views. Synthese, 192, 1–16.
Cleave, M. V., & Gauker, C. (2010). Linguistic practice and false-belief tasks. Mind & Language, 25(3), 298–328. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01391.x.
Dudley, R. E. (2017). The role of input in discovering presuppositions triggers: Figuring out what everybody already knew (Doctoral dissertation).
Dudley, R. E. (2018). Young children’s conceptions of knowledge. Philosophy Compass, 13(6), 1–18.
Dunning, D. (1999). A newer look: Motivated social cognition and the schematic representation of social concepts. Psychological Inquiry, 10(1), 1–11.
Elekes, F., Bródy, G., Halász, E., & Király, I. (2016). Enhanced encoding of the co-actor’s target stimuli during a shared non-motor task. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 69(12), 2376–2389.
Elekes, F., Varga, M., & Király, I. (2017). Level-2 perspectives computed quickly and spontaneously: Evidence from eight- to 9.5-year-old children. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 35, 609–622.
Falck, A., Brinck, I., & Lindgren, M. (2014). Interest contagion in violation-of-expectation-based false-belief tasks. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 23.
Ferguson, C. K., & Kelly, H. H. (1964). Significant factors in overevaluation of own-group’s product. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 69, 223–228.
Fernández Castro, V. (2017). Regulation, normativity and folk psychology. Topoi. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9511-7.
Fernández Castro, V. (2019). Justification, conversation and folk psychology. Theoria, 34(1), 75–91. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.18022.
Fernández Castro, V., & Heras-Escribano, M. (2019). Social Cognition: a normative approach. Acta Analytica. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-019-00388-y.
Fiebich, A., & Coltheart, M. (2015). Various ways to understand other minds. Towards a pluralistic approach to the explanation of social understanding. Mind & Language, 30(3), 235–258.
Fodor, J. (1992). A theory of the child’s theory of mind. Cognition, 44(3), 283–296.
Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2008). The phenomenological mind. London: Routledge.
Gauker, C. (2003). Words without meaning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gilbert, D. T., Krull, D. S., & Pelham, B. W. (1988). Of thoughts unspoken: Social inference and the self-regulation of behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55(5), 685–694.
Goddard, C. (2003). Thinking across languages and cultures: Six dimensions of variation. Cognitive Linguistic, 14(2/3), 109–140.
Goldman, A. I. (1989). Interpretation psychologized. Mind & Language, 4, 161–185.
Goldman, A. I. (2006). Simulating minds. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gopnik, A., & Wellman, H. M. (1994). The theory theory. In L. A. Hirschfeld & S. A. Gelman (Eds.), Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture (pp. 257–293). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gopnik, G. (1996). Theories and modules; creation myths, developmental realities, and neurath’s boat. In P. Carruthers & P. K. Smith (Eds.), Theories of theories of mind (p. 169). Cambridge: University Press.
Gopnik, G., Meltzoff, A. (1997). Words, thoughts, and theories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gordon, R. M. (1996). Radical simulationism. In P. Carruthers & P. K. Smith (Eds.), Theories of theories of mind (pp. 11–21). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. (1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(6), 1464–1480.
Greenwald, A. G., Poehlman, T. A., Uhlmann, E. L., & Banaji, M. R. (2009). Understanding and using the implicit association test: III. Meta-analysis of predictive validity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97(1), 17–41.
Hannikainen, I. (2018). Ideology between the lines: Lay inferences about scientists’ values and motives. Social Psychology and Personality Science, 20(10), 1–10.
Hansen, M. B., Petersen, E. N., Poulsen, A., & Salès-Wuillemin, E. (2017). When belief ascriptions are about more than what is on someone Else's mind. Discourse Processes, 54(8), 655–669. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163853X.2016.1150042.
Hazlett, A. (2010). The myth of Factive verbs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80, 497–522. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00338.
Heal, J. (1998). Co-cognition and off-line simulation: two ways of understanding the simulation approach. Mind & Language, 13, 477–498.
Hirschfeld, L. A. (2013). The myth of mentalizing and the primacy of folk sociology. In M. R. Banaji & S. A. Gelman (Eds.), Oxford series in social cognition and social neuroscience. Navigating the social world: What infants, children, and other species can teach us (pp. 101-106). New York, NY, US: Oxford University Press.
Hutto, D. (2004). The limits of spectatorial folk psychology. Mind & Language, 19, 548–573.
Ito, T. A., Thompson, E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2004). Tracking the time course of social perception: The effects of racial cues on event-related brain potentials. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(10), 1267–1280.
Jussim, L. (2012). Social perception and social reality. Why accuracy dominates bias and self-fulfilling prophecy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Kalish, C. W. (2012). Generalizing norms and preferences within social categories and individuals. Developmental Psychology, 48(4), 1133–1143.
Kiparsky, P., & Kiparsky, C. (1970). Fact. In M. Bierwisch & K. Heidolph (Eds.), Progress in linguistics. The Hague: Mouton.
Knudsen, B., & Liszkowski, U. (2012). Eighteen- and 24-month-old infants correct others in anticipation of action mistakes. Developmental Science, 15(1), 113–122.
Korman, J., & Malle, B. F. (2016). Grasping for traits or reasons? How people grapple with puzzling social behaviors. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 42(11), 1451–1465.
Kulke, L., von Duhn, B., Schneider, D., & Rakoczy, H. (2018). Is implicit theory of mind a real and robust phenomenon? Results from a systematic replication study. Psychological Science, 29, 888–900.
Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 108(3), 480–498.
Levinson, S. C. (2000). Presumptive meanings: The theory of generalized conversational Implicature. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lewis, S., Hacquard, V., & Lidz, J. (2017). “Think” pragmatically: Children’s interpretation of belief reports. Language Learning and Development, 13(4), 395–417.
Liu, J., Harris, A., & Kanwisher, N. (2002). Stages of processing in face perception: An MEG study. Nature Neuroscience, 5(9), 910–916.
Maibom, H. L. (2007). Social systems. Philosophical Psychology, 20(5), 557–578.
Malle, B. F. (2011). Attribution theories: How people make sense of behavior. In D. Chadee (Ed.), Theories in social psychology (pp. 72–95). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Malle, B. F., Knobe, J. M., & Nelson, S. E. (2007). Actor-observer asymmetries in explanations of behavior: New answers to an old question. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93(4), 491–514.
Mameli, M. (2001). Mindreading, mindshaping, and evolution. Biology and Philosophy, 16, 597–628.
McGeer, V. (2007). The regulative dimension of folk psychology. In D. D. Hutto & M. Ratcliffe (Eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed (pp. 137–156). Dodrecht: Springer.
McGeer, V. (2015). Mind-making practices: the social infrastructure of self-knowing agency and responsibility. Philosophical Explorations, 18(2), 259–281.
Meltzoff, A. N., Gopnik, A., & Repacholi, B. M. (1999). Toddlers' understanding of intentions, desires and emotions: Explorations of the dark ages. In P. D. Zelazo, J. W. Astington, & D. R. Olson (Eds.), Developing theories of intention: Social understanding and self-control (pp. 17–41). Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011). Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(2), 57–74.
Mercier, H., Sperber, D. (2017). The enigma of reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Millikan, R. (2004). Varieties of meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod lectures. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Morton, A. (1996). Philosophy in practice: An introduction to the Main questions. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Moscovitch, M. (1995). Confabulation. In D. L. Schacter (Ed.), Memory distortion (pp. 226–251). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Newton, P., Reddy, V., & Bull, R. (2000). Children's everyday deception and performance on false-belief tasks. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 18(2), 297–317.
Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2003). Mindreading: An integrated account of pretence, self-awareness, and understanding other minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nickerson, R. S. (1988). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review of General Psychology, 2(2), 175.
Norman, A. (2016). Why we reason: Intention-alignment and the genesis of human rationality. Biology and Philosophy, 31(5), 685–704.
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2005). Evolution of indirect reciprocity. Nature, 437, 1291–1298.
Nuyts, Jam (2001). Epistemic modality, language, and conceptualization: A cognitive-pragmatic perspective. John Benjamins.
Olivola, C. Y., & Todorov, A. (2010). Fooled by first impressions? Reexamining the diagnostic value of appearance-based inferences. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46(2), 315–324.
Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs? Science, 308(5719), 255–258.
Penn, D. C., & Povinelli, D. J. (2007). On the lack of evidence that non-human animals possess anything remotely resembling a 'theory of mind'. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 362(1480), 731–744. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2006.2023.
Perner, J. (1991). Understanding the representational mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Pettigrew, T. F. (1979). The ultimate attribution error: Extending Allport's cognitive analysis of prejudice. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 5(4), 461–476.
Pronin, E. (2007). Perception and misperception of bias in human judgment. Trends in Cognitive Science, 11(1), 37–43.
Pronin, E., Lin, D. Y., & Ross, L. (2002). The bias blind spot: Perceptions of bias in self versus others. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28(3), 369–381.
Rakoczy, H. (2015). In defense of a developmental dogma: Children acquire propositional attitude folk psychology around age 4. Synthese, 194, 689.
Reddy, V. (2007). Getting back to the rough ground: deception and ‘social living’. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 362(1480), 621–637.
Robinson, E. J., & Mitchell, P. (1995). Masking of children’s early understanding of the representational mind: Backwards explanation versus prediction. Child Development, 66(4), 1022–1039.
Rubio-Fernandez, P., & Geurts, B. (2012). How to pass the false-belief task before your fourth birthday. Psychological Science, 24(1), 27–33.
Ruffman, T., & Perner, J. (2005). Do infants really understand false belief? Trends in Cognitive Science, 9(10), 462–463.
Ruffman, T. (2014). To belief or not belief: Children’s theory of mind. Developmental Review, 34(3), 265–293.
Rule, N. O., Ambady, N., & Adams, R. B., Jr. (2009). Personality in perspective: Judgmental consistency across orientations of the face. Perception, 38, 1688–1699.
Sabbagh, M. A., & Callanan, M. A. (1998). Metarepresentation in action: 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds’ developing theories of mind in parent-child conservations. Developmental Psychology, 34, 491–502.
Sanchez-Curry, D. (2018). Beliefs as inner causes: The (lack of) evidence. Philosophical Psychology, 31(6), 850–877.
Scanlon, T. (1998). What we owe to each other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Scheibman, J. (2001). Local patterns of subjectivity in person and verb type in American English conversation. In J. L. Bybee & P. J. Hopper (Eds.), Frequency and the emergence of linguistic structure (pp. 62–89). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Schneider, S., & And Glikman, J. (2015). Origin and development of French parenthetical verbs. In S. Schneider, J. Glikman, & M. Avanzi (Eds.), Parenthetical verbs (pp. 163–188). Berlin: de Gruyter.
Shatz, M., Wellman, H., & Silber, S. (1983). The acquisition of mental verbs: A systematic investigation of the first reference to mental state. Cognition, 14, 301–321.
Simons, M. (2007). Observations on embedding verbs, evidentiality, and presupposition. Lingua, 117, 1034–1056.
Southgate, V., Senju, A., & Csibra, G. (2007). Action anticipation through attribution of false belief by 2-year-olds. Psychological Science, 18(7), 587–592.
Spaulding, S. (2016). Mind misreading. Philosophical Issues, 26(1), 422–440.
Spaulding, S. (2018). How we understand others: Philosophy and social cognition. London and New York: Routledge Focus.
Stone, T., & Davies, M. (1996). The mental simulation debate: A progress report. In P. Carruthers and P.K. Smith (eds.) Theories of theories of mind (pp 119–137). Cambridage, UK: Cambridge University Press
Strijbos, D. W., & De Bruin, L. C. (2011). Making folk psychology explicit: The relevance of Robert Brandom’s philosophy for the debate on social cognition. Philosophia, 40, 139–163.
Surtees, A., Apperly, I., & Samson, D. (2016). I’ve got your number: Spontaneous perspective-taking in an interactive task. Cognition, 150, 43–52.
Tanney, J. (2013). Rules, reason and self-knowledge. London: Harvard University Press.
Thompson, S. A., & Mulac, A. (1991). A quantitative perspective on the grammaticalization of epistemic parentheticals in English. Approaches to Grammaticalization, 2, 313–329.
Tooming, U. (2016). Beliefs and desires: From attribution to evaluation. Philosophia, 45(1), 359–369.
Urmson, J. O. (1952). Parenthetical verbs. Mind, 6(244), 480–496.
Uttich, K., & Lombrozo, T. (2010). Norms inform mental state ascriptions: a rational explanation for the side- effect effect. Cognition, 116(1), 87–100.
Van Vugt, M., Roberts, G., & Hardy, C. (2007). Competitive altruism: Development of reputation-based cooperation in groups. In R. Dunbar & L. Barrett (Eds.), Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology (pp. 531–540). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wellman, H. R. (2014). Making minds: How theory of mind develops. NY: Oxford University Press.
Westra, E. (2017a). Spontaneous mindreading: A problem for the two-systems account. Synthese, 194(11), 4559–4581.
Westra, E. (2017b). Stereotypes, theory of mind, and the action-prediction hierarchy. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1575-9.
Wierzbicka, A. (2006). English: Meaning and culture. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wilson, G. and Shpall, S. (2016). Action. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/action/>. Accessed 20 April 2019
Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition, 13(1), 103–128.
Wittenbrink, B., Judd, C. M., & Park, B. (2001). Spontaneous prejudice in context: Variability in automatically activated attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(5), 815–827.
Zahavi, D. (2011). Empathy and direct social perception: A phenomenological proposal. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2(3), 541–558.
Zahavi, A., & Zahavi, A. (1997). The handicap principle: A missing piece of Darwin’s puzzle. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zawidzki, T. W. (2011). How to interpret infant socio-cognitive competence. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2(3), 483–497.
Zawidzki, T. W. (2013). Mindshaping: A new framework for understanding human social cognition. Cambridge: MIT Press.
We are thankful to Agustín Vicente and Andreas Falck for reading previous drafts of this paper and for their valuablecomments and suggestions. We are grateful as well for the unconditional philosophical and emotional support to the members of theGranada Gang.
This paper has been funded thanks to the FPI Predoctoral Fellow “BES-2017- 079933”, the Projects FFI2015-65953-P and FFI2016-80088-P funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy, the project ANR-16-CE33-0017 funded by The French National Research Agency and the FiloLab Group of Excellence funded by the Universidad de Granada.
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
About this article
Cite this article
Almagro Holgado, M., Fernandez Castro, V. The Social Cover View: a Non-epistemic Approach to Mindreading. Philosophia 48, 483–505 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00096-2
- Folk psychology
- Social cover