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Philosophia

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Substance Causation

  • Michele Paolini Paoletti
Article
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Abstract

I defend the thesis that, if there are substances, substance causation (i.e., causation by substances) is the only sort of causation in the universe – or the only fundamental sort. Subsequently, I develop an account of substance causation that is partly grounded on a peculiar interpretation of absolute change (i.e., of entities’ coming and ceasing to be) and qualitative change, on some ontological assumptions about modes (i.e., individual properties that ontologically depend on their bearers) and powers. Finally, I reply to some objections against substance causation in general (e.g., C. D. Broad’s objection against causes’ being non-essentially-dated entities) and to some possible objections against my own account and I briefly explore three advantages given by the acceptance of the latter.

Keywords

Substance Causation Substance Causation Powers 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This project has been carried on thanks to a grant by the Durham Emergence Project, generously funded by the John Templeton Foundation and Durham University.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Human StudiesUniversity of MacerataMacerataItaly

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