Philosophia

, Volume 46, Issue 1, pp 83–99 | Cite as

Quine on Shared Language and Linguistic Communities

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Abstract

In this paper, I discuss Quine’s views on language sharing and linguistic communities. It is sometimes explicitly and often implicitly taken for granted that Quine believes that speakers can form communities in which they share a language. The aim of the paper is to show that this is a misinterpretation and, on the contrary, Quine is closer to linguistic individualism – the view according to which there is no guarantee that speakers within a community share a language and the notion of idiolect is more fundamental than the notion of shared language.

Keywords

Quine Meaning Shared Language Publicity Flexible Community Linguistic Individualism 

Notes

Compliance with ethical standards

Conflict of Interest

The author declares that s/he has no conflict of interest.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences, Philosophical FacultyUniversity of Hradec KrálovéHradec KrálovéCzech Republic

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