Skip to main content

A Dilemma for Eternalists

Abstract

In this discussion I argue that, given the possibility of travel to the past, eternalists face a dilemma. They must choose between fatalism and the denial of an intuitive claim about what a traveller to the past cannot do. The eternalist should deny this seemingly intuitive claim which is in fact a version of fatalism about the past.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Notes

  1. I am grateful to Alan Hajek, Hugh Rice, Ryan Wasserman, and an audience at ANU, for useful discussion of this topic.

Reference

  • Lewis, D. (1976). The Paradoxes of Time Travel. American Philosophical Quarterly, 13 (1), 145–152.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Brian Garrett.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Garrett, B. A Dilemma for Eternalists. Philosophia 45, 1735–1739 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9880-6

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9880-6

Keywords

  • Eternalism
  • Time Travel
  • David Lewis
  • Fatalism