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A Dilemma for Eternalists

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Abstract

In this discussion I argue that, given the possibility of travel to the past, eternalists face a dilemma. They must choose between fatalism and the denial of an intuitive claim about what a traveller to the past cannot do. The eternalist should deny this seemingly intuitive claim which is in fact a version of fatalism about the past.

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Notes

  1. I am grateful to Alan Hajek, Hugh Rice, Ryan Wasserman, and an audience at ANU, for useful discussion of this topic.

Reference

  • Lewis, D. (1976). The Paradoxes of Time Travel. American Philosophical Quarterly, 13 (1), 145–152.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Philosophy, RSSS ANU, ACT, Canberra, 0200, Australia

    Brian Garrett

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  1. Brian Garrett
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Correspondence to Brian Garrett.

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Garrett, B. A Dilemma for Eternalists. Philosophia 45, 1735–1739 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9880-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9880-6

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