Epistemic Uniqueness and the Practical Relevance of Epistemic Practices
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By taking the practical relevance of coordinated epistemic standards into account, Dogramaci and Horowitz (Philosophical Issues, 26(1), 130–147, 2016) as well as Greco and Hedden (The Journal of Philosophy, 113(8), 365–395, 2016) offer a new perspective on epistemic permissiveness. However, in its current state, their argument appears to be inconclusive. I will offer two reasons why this argument does not support interpersonal uniqueness in general. First, such an argument leaves open the possibility that distinct closed societies come to incompatible epistemic standards. Second, some epistemic practices like the promotion of methodological heterogeneity in epistemic communities could be best explained by epistemic permissiveness.
KeywordsRationality Uniqueness Epistemic peer Epistemic labour
This research was financed by the Groupe de Recherche Interuniversitaire sur la Normativité (GRIN) and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (#767-2016-1771). Thanks to Daniel Laurier, Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette, Andrew Reisner, Xander Selene and two anonymous referees for their invaluable comments and suggestions.
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