Abstract
Are our actions morally good because we approve of them or are they good independently of our approval? Are we projecting moral values onto the world or do we detect values that are already there? For many these questions don’t state a real alternative but a secular variant of the Euthyphro dilemma: If our actions are good because we approve of them moral goodness appears to be arbitrary. If they are good independently of our approval, it is unclear how we come to know their moral quality and how moral knowledge can be motivating. None of these options seems attractive; the source of moral goodness unclear. Despite the growing literature on Kant’s moral epistemology and moral epistemology the question remains open what Kant’s answer to this apparent dilemma is. The Kantian view I attempt to lay out in this paper is supposed to dissolve the secular version of the Euthyphro dilemma. In responding to this dilemma we need to get clear about the source or the origin of our moral knowledge: Voluntary approval or mind-independent moral facts? Projectivism or detectivism? Construction or given? I believe that all these ways of articulating the problem turn out, on closer inspection, to be false alternatives.
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Acknowledgements
I am very much indebted to Stefano Bacin, Carla Bagnoli, Patrick Kain, Pauline Kleingeld, Nico Naeve, Lara Ostaric, Fabienne Peter, Fred Rauscher, Joe Saunders, Dieter Schönecker, Irina Schumski, Oliver Sensen, Melissa Zinkin, and two anonymous referees for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. My work on this article was funded by the Netherlands Organization of Scientific Research (NWO).
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Bojanowski, J. Kant’s Solution to the Euthyphro Dilemma. Philosophia 44, 1209–1228 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9747-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9747-2