Abstract
Both the pessimistic inductions over scientific theories and over scientists are built upon what I call proportional pessimism: as theories are discarded, the inductive rationale for concluding that the next theories will be discarded grows stronger. I argue that proportional pessimism clashes with the fact that present theories are more successful than past theories, and with the implications of the assumptions that there are finitely many and infinitely many unconceived alternatives. Therefore, the two pessimistic inductions collapse along with proportional pessimism.
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Notes
I thank a referee for sharpening my point.
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Acknowledgements
This paper improved a lot thanks to anonymous referees’ insightful and useful comments. I also thank Craig Callender for his hospitality. I wrote this paper while I was visiting his department at University of California – San Diego in 2015.
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Park, S. Refutations of the Two Pessimistic Inductions. Philosophia 44, 835–844 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9733-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9733-8