, Volume 43, Issue 4, pp 925–931

Olympia and Other O-Machines


DOI: 10.1007/s11406-015-9613-7

Cite this article as:
Klein, C. Philosophia (2015) 43: 925. doi:10.1007/s11406-015-9613-7


Against Maudlin, I argue that machines which merely reproduce a pre-programmed series of changes ought to be classed with Turing’s O-Machines even if they would counterfactually show Turing Machine-like activity. This can be seen on an interventionist picture of computational architectures, on which basic operations are the primitive loci for interventions. While constructions like Maudlin’s Olympia still compute, then, claims about them do not threaten philosophical arguments that depend on Turing Machine architectures and their computational equivalents.


Computation Computability Implementation Turing machines Consciousness 

Funding information

Funder NameGrant NumberFunding Note
Australian Research Council
  • FT140100422

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyMacquarie UniversitySydneyAustralia

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