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Philosophia

, Volume 43, Issue 2, pp 475–483 | Cite as

On the PROVER9 Ontological Argument

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Abstract

Oppenheimer & Zalta have re-formulated their non-modal version of the ontological argument, with the help of PROVER9, an automated reasoning engine. The authors end up rejecting the new argument; however, the theist has a rejoinder worth considering. But after presenting the rejoinder, I highlight that the conceivability of the being does not imply its possibility. One lesson is that even non-modal ontological arguments must engage modal matters concerning God. Another lesson is that if PROVER9 is able to derive a conclusion from fewer premises, the proof is sometimes inferior as an argument.

Keywords

Atheism-theism debate The ontological argument for God's existence Being Modality Impossibilia or impossible objects 

Notes

Acknowledgments

My thanks to Ed Zalta and an anonymous referee for comments and discussion on this material.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy (0126)Virginia TechBlacksburgUSA

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