, Volume 43, Issue 2, pp 427–434 | Cite as

Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology as Religious Epistemology: A Response to Bobier

  • Joe MilburnEmail author


In a recent paper, Christopher Bobier (2014) has argued that Duncan Pritchard’s (2012) Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology (ALVE) cannot account for knowledge that we have through Divine Revelation. This gives philosophers who believe that Divine Revelation can be source of knowledge reason to reject ALVE. Bobier’s arguments are specifically against ALVE, but they serve as arguments against all sorts of (modest) virtue epistemologies. In this paper then, I will critically examine Bobier’s argument, and contend that (modest) virtue epistemologies are compatible with knowledge through Divine Revelation.


Anti-luck virtue epistemology Religious epistemology Divine revelation 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentThe University of PittsburghPittsburghUSA

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