Trivialism is the doctrine that everything is true. Almost nobody believes it, but, as Priest (2000) shows, finding a non-question-begging argument against it turns out to be a difficult task. In this paper, I propose a statistical argument against trivialism, developing a strategy different from those presented in Priest (1999, 2000, 2006).
KeywordsDialetheism Trivialism Graham Priest Peter van Inwagen
Many thanks to an anonymous referee and to audiencies at NIP and the University of Padua, in particular Francesco Berto, Graham Priest and Stephan Torre. This paper is dedicated to the memory of Lorenzo Bernardi.
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