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Philosophia

, Volume 43, Issue 2, pp 499–504 | Cite as

Could Everything Be True? Probably Not

  • Matteo PlebaniEmail author
Article

Abstract

Trivialism is the doctrine that everything is true. Almost nobody believes it, but, as Priest (2000) shows, finding a non-question-begging argument against it turns out to be a difficult task. In this paper, I propose a statistical argument against trivialism, developing a strategy different from those presented in Priest (1999, 2000, 2006).

Keywords

Dialetheism Trivialism Graham Priest Peter van Inwagen 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Many thanks to an anonymous referee and to audiencies at NIP and the University of Padua, in particular Francesco Berto, Graham Priest and Stephan Torre. This paper is dedicated to the memory of Lorenzo Bernardi.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Human ScienceUniversity of BasilicataPotenzaItaly
  2. 2.Department of Philosophy and Cultural HeritageCa’ Foscari UniversityVeneziaItaly

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