A Problem for Ontological Pluralism and a Half-Meinongian Solution
- 176 Downloads
According to K. McDaniel’s and J. Turner’s Ontological Pluralism, there are many ways of being that are more fundamental than being in general. In this paper, I shall analyze some constraints on this doctrine. Among other, ontological pluralists are committed to the idea that there are no things that have no way of being at all and that it is not legitimate to quantify over ways of being. Later on, I shall introduce a problem for ontological pluralism: if there is a privileged way of being an ontological pluralist (characterized by the claim that there are only some definite ways of being), then, given those constraints, ontological pluralists cannot logically express that privileged way. Finally, I shall justify the acceptance of a Half-Meinongian solution to this problem, that is roughly grounded on the acceptance of entities that have no way of being at all.
KeywordsOntological Pluralism Existence Quantifier
- Frege, G. (1960). In P. T. Geach & M. Black (Eds.), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Blackwell: Oxford.Google Scholar
- McDaniel, K. (2009). Ways of Being. In D. J. Chalmers, D. Manley, & R. Wassermann (Eds.), Metametaphysics. New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Russell, B. (1996). The Principles of Mathematics. New York: Norton.Google Scholar
- Turner, J. (2010). Ontological pluralism. The Journal of Philosophy, 107(1), 4–34.Google Scholar