The paper provides a new and detailed critique of Barker and Dowe’s argument against multi-location. This critique is not only novel but also less committal than previous ones in the literature in that it does not require hefty metaphysical assumptions. The paper also provides an analysis of some metaphysical relations between mereological and locational principles.
KeywordsMultilocation Additivity of location Mereological fusion Extension
We want to thank two anonymous referees of this journal for their insightful comments and suggestions on a different draft of the paper. Damiano Costa is grateful for support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (doc.mobility funding scheme).
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