Philosophia

, Volume 42, Issue 2, pp 321–334 | Cite as

Yes, Safety is in Danger

Article

Abstract

In an essay recently published in this journal (“Is Safety in Danger?”), Fernando Broncano-Berrocal defends the safety condition on knowledge from a counterexample proposed by Tomas Bogardus (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2012). In this paper, we will define the safety condition, briefly explain the proposed counterexample, and outline Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety condition. We will then raise four objections to Broncano-Berrocal’s defense, four implausible implications of his central claim. In the end, we conclude that Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety condition is unsuccessful, and that the safety condition on knowledge should be rejected.

Keywords

Methods of belief formation Bogardus Knowledge Safety Epistemic luck 

References

  1. Bogardus, T. (2012). Knowledge under threat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00564.x.Google Scholar
  2. Broncano-Berrocal, F. (forthcoming). Is safety in danger? Philosophia.Google Scholar
  3. Hawthorne, J. (2004). Knowledge and lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  4. Luper, S. (2006). Restorative rigging and the safe indication account. Synthese, 153, 161–170.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Pritchard, D. (2005). Epistemic luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Sainsbury, R. M. (1997). Easy possibilities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57, 907–919.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Sosa, E. (1999). How to defeat opposition to Moore. In J. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical perspectives 13: Epistemology. Blackwell, 141–154.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyPepperdine UniversityMalibuUSA

Personalised recommendations