Alston, W. (2005). Beyond “Justification”: Dimensions of epistemic evaluation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Aquinas, T. (1981). In The Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Ed.), Summa Theologica. Westminster: Christian Classics.
Aquinas, T. (1993). In C. I. Litzinger (Ed.), Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. South Bend: Dumb Ox Books.
Aquinas, T. (1994). In R. W. Mulligan (Ed.), Truth. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
Aquinas, T. (2005). In E. M. Atkins & T. Williams (Eds.), Disputed questions on the virtues. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Aquinas, T. (2012). Corpus Thomisticum, S. Thomae de Aquino pera omnia. The University of Navarre. www.unav.es/filosofia/alarcon/amicis/ctopera.html#OM. Accessed 13 November 2012.
Audi, R. (2006). Testimony, credulity, and veracity. In J. Lackey & E. Sosa (Eds.), The epistemology of testimony. New York: Oxford University Press.
Baehr, J. (2006). Character, reliability and virtue epistemology. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56(223), 193–212.
Baehr, J. (2008). Four varieties of character-based virtue epistemology. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 46, 469–502.
Bloomfield, P. (2011). Justice as a self-regarding virtue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXXXII(1), 46–64.
Frances, B. (2010). The reflective epistemic renegade. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXXXI(2), 419–463.
Fricker, M. (2003). Epistemic injustice and a role for virtue in the politics of knowing. Metaphilosophy, 34, 154–173.
Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. New York: Oxford University Press.
Greco, J. (1999). Agent Reliabilism. In T. James (Ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 13: Epistemology. Atascadero: Ridgeview Press.
Greco, J. (2010). Achieving knowledge: A virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hibbs, T. (1999). Aquinas, virtue, and recent epistemology. The Review of Metaphysics, 52(3), 573–594.
Kawall, J. (2002). Other-regarding epistemic virtues. Ratio, XV, 257–275.
Lackey, J. (1999). Testimonial knowledge and transmission. The Philosophical Quarterly, 49(197), 472–490.
Lackey, J. (2007). Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know. Synthese, 158, 345–361.
Lackey, J. (2009). Knowledge and credit. Philosophical Studies, 142, 27–42.
Lepock, C. (2011). Unifying the intellectual virtues. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXXXIII(1), 106–128.
Moros, E. R., & Umbers, R. J. (2004). Distinguishing virtues from faculties in virtue epistemology. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, XLII, 61–85.
Riggs, W. (2009). Two problems of easy credit. Synthese, 169, 201–216.
Roberts, R. C., & Wood, W. J. (2007). Intellectual virtues: An essay in regulative epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Zagzebski, L. (1996). Virtues of the mind: An inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zagzebski, L. (2007). Ethical and epistemic egoism and the ideal of autonomy. Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology, 4(3), 252–263.
Zagzebski, L. (2012). “Trust.” http://www.ou.edu/ouphil/faculty/zagzebski/Trust.pdf. Accessed 13 November 2012.