Abstract
According to Pettit, an account of freedom in terms of rational control fails to suffice, for he argues that such an account lacks the resources to rule out coerced actions as unfree. The crucial feature of a coerced action is that it leaves the agent with a choice to make, an apparently rational choice to make. To the extent that it does this, it would seem to leave the agent as free as he would be in any other case where there is a choice to be made. However, we do not consider actions that are coerced to be on a par with actions that are not coerced, that are performed freely as we might say. We do not hold agents similarly responsible in the two sorts of cases. So it would seem that the rational control account fails, for it appears to fail to vindicate this differential practice. In this paper, I defend the rational control account. I outline two ways in which proponents of a rational control model, broadly understood, can respond to this criticism.
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Notes
My thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this point.
Admittedly, the account depends on certain strong claims made which can only be sketched here not defended, namely about the objective bases of the various states (especially that of valuing), as well as about what autonomous modes of formation involve. But what is indicated is one of the virtues of the account: given the identification of the ’proper determinants’ of the various states, an account of autonomy is provided which avoids the problem of regress (which arguably besets certain other accounts). Importantly, what is argued in this paper is that given this account of autonomy and the characterization of a rational control theory, the theory has the resources to meet Pettit’s challenge on coercion.
I thank an anonymous referee for providing this challenge to the account.
References
Leon, M. (2000). Believing autonomously. In B. Elevitch (Ed.), Proceedings of the twentieth world congress of philosophy, vol. 9: Philosophy of mind and psychology.
Pettit, P. (2001). A theory of freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stampe, D. W., & Gibson, M. I. (1992). Of one’s own free will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol LII.
Wolf, S. (1990). Freedom within reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Leon, M. Reason and Coercion: In defence of a Rational Control Account of Freedom. Philosophia 39, 733–740 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9321-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9321-x