, Volume 39, Issue 3, pp 597–613 | Cite as

Dualism in the Epistemology of Testimony and the Ability Intuition

  • Spyridon Orestis PalermosEmail author


In her book, Learning From Words (2008), Jennifer Lackey extensively argues for what she calls a dualist account of testimonial knowledge. That is to say, testimonial justification or warrant is neither reducible to, nor completely independent of basic sources of knowledge such as sense perception, memory and inductive inference. Instead, Lackey prompts us to move beyond the heated debate between reductionism and non-reductionism and towards her dualist account, which, she claims, can accommodate both of these views.

Lackey, however, does not classify her account into any of the broader trends of contemporary epistemology, despite the fact that she (2007) has argued against virtue reliabilism through a counterexample of … testimonial knowledge, viz. the Morris case (2007, 352).1 Conversely, the aim of the present paper is to investigate whether Lackey’s astute analysis is in line with the ability intuition–i.e. the idea that knowledge must be the product of cognitive...


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences (PPLS), The University of EdinburghEdinburghUK

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