, Volume 40, Issue 1, pp 75–97 | Cite as

Inferentialism and the Normativity of Meaning



There may be various reasons for claiming that meaning is normative, and additionally, very different senses attached to the claim. However, all such claims have faced fierce resistance from those philosophers who insist that meaning is not normative in any nontrivial sense of the word. In this paper I sketch one particular approach to meaning claiming its normativity and defend it against the anti-normativist critique: namely the approach of Brandomian inferentialism. However, my defense is not restricted to inferentialism in any narrow sense for it encompasses a much broader spectrum of approaches to meaning, connected with the Wittgensteinian and especially Sellarsian view of language as an essentially rule-governed enterprise; and indeed I refrain from claiming that the version of inferentialism I present here is in every detail the version developed by Brandom.


Meaning Normativity Inferentialism 


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences of the Czech RepublicPragueCzech Republic
  2. 2.Faculty of Philosophy, University of Hradec KrálovéHradec KrálovéCzech Republic

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