Abstract
Dispositionalist theories of mental content have been attacked on the grounds that they are incompatible with semantic holism. In this paper, I resist important worries of this variety, raised by Paul Boghossian. I argue that his objections can be avoided by a conceptual role version of dispositionalism, where the multifarious relationships between mental contents are grounded on the relationships between their corresponding, grounding dispositions.
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Notes
The considerations that problematize the determinacy of meaning (and hence semantic dispositionalism), originally raised by Kripke (1982), apply equally to a public language and the language of thought.
Conditions C are oftentimes referred to as ‘Type 1 Conditions’ in order to distinguish between two kinds of conditions: those under which one acts correctly and those conditions under which one acts mistakenly. In part for stylistic reasons, I shall often use the expression ‘appropriate conditions’ (or a variation of this) to mean ‘Type 1 Conditions.’ In any case, for present purposes, I remain agnostic as to the best theory of such conditions.
Mental contents may be understood as being holistically governed in either of two respects. First, mental states might be holistic as a matter of interpretation—of attributing propositional attitudes to someone—in that understanding what someone is thinking about requires making sense of their actions or utterances against a larger pattern. Secondly, mental states might be holistic as a matter of constitution, in that the content of a mental state is determined, at least in part, by its relationship to other mental states. Boghossian is clearly interested in this second sense.
Boghossian is concerned with the arbitrary robustness of mental states, at least insofar as possessing one belief can be affected by holding others. There is reason to think, though, that the emphasis on belief fixation is just one instance of content-determination. For Boghossian’s (1989) worry is raised for dispositionalist attempts to fix the content of mental states (as well as fix the meaning of expressions in a public language). That one belief might affect possessing another belief, according to the semantic holism, plays a role in determining the content of each of the beliefs involved. As such, I make no significant distinction between speaking of belief fixation and of determining the content of a mental state; the former is just an instance of the latter.
It has been argued by McManus (2000) that the Infinity Objection makes the same basic assumption as any other ceteris paribus clause: namely, that any such clause is essentially open-ended. According to McManus, the strength of the Infinity Objection relies on this more general problem for a disposition qualified under a ceteris paribus clause, and is not uniquely motivated by holism. The success of my reply to the Infinity and Circularity Objections (below), though, suggests otherwise.
Miller (1997) argues that the Infinity Objection undermines a Lewis-inspired dispositionalism along with Boghossian’s original target. Though such an account is a variety of functionalism—and hence resembles conceptual role semantics in one respect—one might plausibly wonder whether a Lewis-style approach can avoid the Infinity Objection in much the way that I have suggested. It is not implausible to think that a sufficiently augmented account could avoid Boghossian’s concerns. But a Lewis-style approach fails in an additional respect. As Miller argues, such an approach requires citing platitudes from our folk theory of mind in order to specify the functional roles characterizing contentful mental states, and the Infinity Objection recurs for the task of specifying such platitudes.
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Podlaskowski, A.C. Reconciling Semantic Dispositionalism with Semantic Holism. Philosophia 38, 169–178 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-009-9203-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-009-9203-7