Abstract
Although Hume has no developed semantic theory, in the heyday of analytic philosophy he was criticized for his “meaning empiricism,” which supposedly committed him to a private world of ideas, led him to champion a genetic account of meaning instead of an analytic one, and confused “impressions” with “perceptions of an objective realm.” But another look at Hume’s “meaning empiricism” reveals that his criterion for cognitive content, the cornerstone both of his resolutely anti-metaphysical stance and his naturalistic “science of human nature,” provides the basis for a successful response to his critics. Central to his program for reforming philosophy, Hume’s use of the criterion has two distinct aspects: a critical or negative aspect, which assesses the content of the central notions of metaphysical theories to demonstrate their unintelligibility; and a constructive or positive aspect, which accurately determines the cognitive content of terms and ideas.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Ardal, P. (1977). Convention and value. In G. P. Morice (Ed.), David Hume: bicentenary papers (pp. 51–68). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Bennett, J. (2000). Learning from six philosophers. Oxford: Clarendon.
Bennett, J. (2001). Empiricism about meanings. In P. Millican (Ed.), Reading Hume on human understanding (pp. 97–106). Oxford: Clarendon.
Broughton, J. (1992). What does the scientist of man observe. Human Studies, 18(2), 155–168.
Greig, J. Y. T. (Ed.) (1932). The letters of David Hume. Oxford: Clarendon.
Hume, D. (1975). An enquiry concerning human understanding. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon.
Hume, D. (1978). A treatise of human nature. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon.
Mackie, J. L. (1980). Hume’s moral theory. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Morris, W.E. Meaning(fullness) Without Metaphysics: Another Look at Hume’s “Meaning Empiricism”. Philosophia 37, 441–454 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9153-5
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9153-5