Abstract
This paper aims to challenge the view that the sign present in many Frankfurt-style scenarios is insufficiently robust to constitute evidence for the possibility of an alternate decision, and therefore inadequate as a means of determining moral responsibility. I have amended Frankfurt’s original scenario, so as to allow Jones, as well as Black, the opportunity to monitor his (Jones’s) own inclination towards a particular decision (the sign). Different outcome possibilities are presented, to the effect that Jones’s awareness of his own inclinations leads to the conclusion that the sign must be either (a) a prior determinate of the decision about to be made, (b) prior and indeterminate (therefore allowing for a contra-inclination decision to be made), or (c) constitutive of a decision that Jones has made but is not yet aware of. In effect, this means that, prior to the intervention of Black, Jones must have decided to do otherwise or could have so decided. Either way, although Frankfurt’s conclusion, that Jones could not have done other than he did, is upheld, the idea that he could not have decided otherwise must be rejected, and with it the view that the sign is nothing more than a flicker of freedom insufficient for assigning morally responsibility.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Fischer and Ravizza (1998), for example, claim that moral responsibility is dependent upon the type of control condition that the protagonist is subject to – be it guidance (responsible) or regulative (not responsible). For detailed discussion on this and other aspects of Fischer and Ravizza’a position, see Haji (2005).
Adapted from Schnall (2001).
If by reliable indicator we mean that it indicates only what is likely to occur, then we are left to wonder: How likely is likely? If, on the other hand, the reliable indicator cannot indicate anything other than what the decision will be then this is suggestive of determinism. It also returns us to the question I posed earlier: What is the difference between Jones knowing what he is about to decide and knowing his actual decision if one necessarily follows from the other?
For a detailed discussion on such capricious, forced-choice conditions, see Balaguer (2004).
Even though, under these conditions, this rationalisation makes no difference to the decision, perhaps it provides us with a sense of freedom. This is compatible, I believe, with Korsgaard’s (1996) Kantian claim that in order to do anything, we must decide what to do as if we are free (p.163).
Once again we are left to consider whether such an eventuality leads us towards determinism.
References
Balaguer, M. (2004). A coherent, naturalistic, and plausible formulation of libertarian free will. Noûs, 38(3), 379–406.
Bittner, T. (1996). Consciousness and the act of will. Philosophical Studies, 81, 331–341.
Blumenfeld, D. (1971). The principle of alternate posibilities. The Journal of Philosophy, 68(11), 339–345.
Fischer, J. M. (1994). The metaphysics of free will. Oxford: Blackwell.
Fischer, J. M. (2002). Frankfurt-style examples, responsibility and semi-compatibilism. In R. Kane (Ed.), Free will. Oxford: Blackwell.
Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1991). Responsibility and inevitability. Ethics, 101(2), 258–278.
Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998). Responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frankfurt, H. G. (1969). Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. The Journal of Philosophy, 66(23), 829–839.
Haji, I. (2005). Introduction: Semi-compatibilism, reasons-responsiveness, and ownership. Philosophical Explorations, 8(2), 91–93.
Kornhuber, H. H., & Deecke, L. (1965). Hirnpotentialänderungen bei Willkűrbewegungen und passiven Bewegungen des Menschen: Bereitschaftspotential und reafferente Potentiale. Pflűgers Archiv fűr Gesamte Physiologie, 284, 1–17.
Korsgaard, C. M. (1996). Creating the kingdom of ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lamb, J. W. (1993). Evaluative compatibilism and the principle of alternate possibilities. The Journal of Philosophy, 90(10), 517–527.
Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. (1983). Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential): The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain, 106, 623–642.
McKenna, M. (2005). Reasons reactivity and incompatibilist intuitions. Philosophical Explorations, 8(2), 131–143.
Pereboom, D. (2000). Alternative Possibilities and Causal Histories. In: J. E. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 14, Action and Freedom: A Supplement to Noûs, 119–137.
Schnall, I. M. (2001). The principle of alternate possibilities and ‘ought’ implies ‘can.’ Analysis, 61(4), 335–340.
Stephens, G. L. (1996). Commentary on “free will in the light of neuropsychiatry.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 3(2), 97–98.
Stump, E. (1996). Libertarian freedom and the principle of alternative possibilities. In J. Jordan & D. Howard-Snyder (Eds.), Faith, freedom, and rationality (pp. 73–88). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Widerker, D. (1995). Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s attack on the principle of alternative possibilities. The Philosophical Review, 104(2), 247–261.
Young, G. (2006). Preserving the role of conscious decision making in the Initiation of intentional action. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(3), 51–68.
Zagzebski, L. (2000). Does Libertarian Freedom Require Alternate Possibilities? In J. E. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 14, Action and Freedom: A Supplement to Noûs, 231–248.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Young, G. Igniting the Flicker of Freedom: Revisiting the Frankfurt Scenario. Philosophia 35, 171–180 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9058-8
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9058-8