Philosophia

, Volume 34, Issue 2, pp 173–188

Modal Stability and Warrant

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11406-006-9023-y

Cite this article as:
Ruloff, C.P. Philosophia (2006) 34: 173. doi:10.1007/s11406-006-9023-y
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Abstract

Keith DeRose believes that it is a strength of his contextualist analysis that it explains why the recently much-discussed skeptical Argument from Ignorance (AI) is so persuasive. Not only that, however; DeRose also believes that he is able to explain the underlying dynamics of AI by utilizing solely the epistemological and linguistic resources contained within his contextualist analysis. DeRose believes, in other words, that his contextualist analysis functions as a genuinely self-contained explanation of skepticism. But does it? In this paper I argue that DeRose’s analysis does not function as a self-contained explanation of skepticism since, as it turns out, DeRose’s analysis is simply irrelevant to the main concerns of the skeptic. To the extent that DeRose’s analysis is irrelevant in this way, I conclude that such an analysis cannot be considered a satisfactory treatment of AI.

Keywords

warrant skepticism internalism 

Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyKwantlen University CollegeSurreyCanada
  2. 2.University of North TexasAustinUSA

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