Agent based model of a simple economy

  • Vladimír Gazda
  • Marek GrófEmail author
  • Július Horváth
  • Matúš Kubák
  • Tomáš Rosival
Regular Article


This article proposes a model of a simple economy based on a set of agent-based modeling principles. The model is based on the “trust game” formulated by Berg et al. (Games Econ Behav 10:122–142, 1995), and anticipates a random matching of partners taking in to account adaptive agent behavior. Simulation in the NetLogo programming environment, using profile distributions obtained from empirical studies, has shown the most successful agents to posses low parameters of trust in the role of Sender and high parameters of trustworthiness in the role of Receiver.


Trust Trustworthiness Agent-based model Trust game 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vladimír Gazda
    • 1
  • Marek Gróf
    • 1
    Email author
  • Július Horváth
    • 2
  • Matúš Kubák
    • 1
  • Tomáš Rosival
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of EconomicsTechnical University of KošiceKosiceSlovakia
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsCentral European UniversityBudapestHungary

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