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An Operational Code Analysis of China’s National Defense White Papers: 1998-2015

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Abstract

Scholarly efforts to predict the future character of the U.S.-China relationship abound. Few however looks to leaders’ beliefs as valid explanatory variables. In this paper, we argue that state leaders’ belief systems are key to understanding both the states’ intentions and policy choices. We analyze China’s national defense white papers (1998–2015) published to date as the source material to gauge the core collective beliefs of three generations of Chinese leadership. The operational code framework is employed to conceptualize and measure these beliefs. Our results identified important crossgenerational changes in a few belief indicators. In the Xi Jinping era, for instance, the political world is seen as less friendly and cooperative strategies are viewed less favorably. In terms of tactics, the policy tools “threaten” and “promise” are viewed as significantly more useful by the current leadership than by past Chinese leaders.

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Notes

  1. For a comprehensive review of literature predicting the future of the U.S.-China relationship, see Friedberg [8].

  2. In November 1995, the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China issued the first defense-related white paper on “Arms Control and Disarmament.” However, the Chinese government considers the 1998 publication (“China’s National Defense in 1998”) as the first official defense white paper.

  3. All white papers are available in English released by the Chinese government. The 2015 version can be found on the State Council’s website (http://china.org.cn/china/2015-05/26/content_35661433.htm). All others are available at http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/. A short summary of the each defense white paper can be found at “Overview of All China’s White Papers on National Defense” (http://eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/2015-05/27/content_4587121.htm)

  4. Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China for 2002, Department of Defense: http://archive.defense.gov/news/Jul2002/d20020712china.pdf (accessed March 2017).

  5. For full text of the 2013 white paper, see: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c_132312681.htm

  6. For full text of the 2015 white paper, see: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm

  7. Both were provided by Social Science Automation, Inc.

  8. For a detailed discussion on VICS, see Walker (2004).

  9. Renshon [30] provides an example to illustrate how the VICS codes the following sentence, “Russian military forces have invaded India.” The subject of this sentence is “Russian military forces,” which would be coded as referring to an “other.” The verb phrase “have invaded” is in the past tense, and the directionality is negative and high in intensity. Thus, this verb phrase would be coded as “punish” (−3).

  10. See, e.g., Sophie Beach, “Xi Jinping Outlines More Assertive Foreign Policy Goals,” December 2, 2014, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/12/xi-jinping-outlines-assertive-foreign-policy-goals/; Masayuki Masuda, “Why has Chinese foreign policy become more assertive?” February 20, 2016, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/02/20/why-has-chinese-foreign-policy-become-more-assertive/; Michael Yahuda, “China’s New Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” Journal of Contemporary China 22, no. 81 [47]: 446–59.; Aaron L. Friedberg, “China’s Recent Assertiveness: Implications for the Future of U.S.-China Relations,” Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 25, 2014, Washington, DC, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Friedberg_Testimony%20.pdf.

  11. ‘Xi Jinping zai zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhiju di san ci jiti xuexi shi qiangdiao genghao tongchou guonei guoji liangge daju, hangshi zou heping fazhan daolu de jichu’ [Xi Jinping stressed at the 3rd study session of the Politburo theneedforcoordinatingdomesticandinternationalstrategicsituation, building a solid foundation for walking on the peaceful development road], People’s Daily, January 30, 2013.

  12. Ibid.

  13. ‘Xi Jinping qiangdiao qiangjun yu hanwei “hexin liyi”’ [Xi Jinping emphasizes building up a strong military and protecting ‘core interests’], BBC Chinese net, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/china/2014/03/140312_ xi_jinping_core_interests.

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Dr. Stephen Walker for his valuable advice and comments on various theoretical and technical issues examined in this paper.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, James Madison University, 91 E. Grace St., MSC 7705, Harrisonburg, VA, 22807, USA

    Yi Edward Yang & Jonathan W. Keller

  2. Herndon, VA, USA

    Joseph Molnar

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Correspondence to Yi Edward Yang.

Appendix [30]

Appendix [30]

Table 6 Interpretation of operational code beliefs
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Yang, Y.E., Keller, J.W. & Molnar, J. An Operational Code Analysis of China’s National Defense White Papers: 1998-2015. J OF CHIN POLIT SCI 23, 585–602 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-017-9524-5

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