Abstract
It is generally agreed that China has a poor domestic human rights practice. In contrast, China has a better-than-average voting record on human rights in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Based on a new UNGA human rights dataset that we identified, we found that since joining the United Nations (UN) in 1971, China voted in the affirmative on human rights resolutions 79 % of the time, compared to the world average favoring ratio of 75 %. This positive image of consistently voting in the affirmative on UNGA human rights resolutions suggests a second image of China’s human rights. However, while the Chinese government is willing to accept the international human rights regime, it also strategically alters its endorsement of UNGA human rights resolutions based on changing levels of domestic threats.
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Notes
The coding criteria of the CIRI dataset “were developed both to reflect the meanings of various human rights as defined in international human rights law and to represent the myriad ways in which the expectations of human rights law and actual government behavior intersect” ([3], 399). Another very popular dataset, the Political Terror Scale (PTS), also provides data on human rights abuses and examines both state and non-state actors on human rights abuses. Although the PTS dataset uses the same sources as CIRI, US State Department and Amnesty International, it is not as detailed in categories as the CIRI dataset.
When coding values for these categories, “Coders must use only the information included in the US State Department Country Report for the year they are coding. They may not use outside information, including personal information or experiences” ([4], 6).
Among the few existing studies that analyze this research question, [48], for example, investigates China’s positive evolving actions regarding international human rights issues, such as on Darfur.
[13].
E.g., [41], 185-186.
[5], 133.
E.g., [26], 705.
E.g., [6], 50.
[34], 8.
[39], 40.
[10], 899.
[34], 8.
E.g., [40], 55.
[37], 664.
[28], 3.
[35], 62.
See [14], 173.
When we began this project in late 2014, Erik Voeten’s UN dataset ended in the year of 2012. See [42].
This is because the People’s Republic of China became a UN member in 1971.
This category of human rights resolutions contained the key word “human rights” or “right to” in the title of a resolution.
Among the commonly used categories of the CIRI data, only freedom of assembly and association, freedom of speech, and workers’ rights were missing from the UNGA data. However, these three categories were possibly being addressed by the general category of human rights.
However, among these 704 human rights resolutions, we found that 13 resolutions (i.e., 12 on religion and 1 on racism) contain some controversial language that can be viewed as limiting free speech and thereby undermining human rights. For instance, a 2005 resolution on “combating defamation of religions” contains the language “Urges States to take resolute action to prohibit the dissemination through political institutions and organizations of racist and xenophobic ideas and material aimed at any religion or its followers that constitute incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.” This example indicates limiting free speech in order to protect religion. Nonetheless, the language contained in these 13 resolutions overall supports human rights. In addition, 13 resolutions comprise of less than 2 % of the total resolutions examined in this study. As a result, we expect these 13 resolutions to have a negligible effect on our conclusions.
For each category in the CIRI data, we provided two scores in parenthesis: the first score shows China’s human rights and the second one indicates the world average. The results are the following: disappearance (.629 and .830), extrajudicial killing (.194 and .663), political imprisonment (.016 and .554), torture (.032 and .398), freedom of assembly and association (0 and .543), freedom of domestic movement (.048 and .753), freedom of foreign movement (.306 and .711), freedom of speech (.097 and .496), electoral self-determination (.048 and .553), freedom of religion (.016 and .668), workers’ rights (0 and .465), women’s rights (.443 and .490), and independent judiciary (.129 and .584).
Once again, these resolutions on religion contain some controversial language. However, the language overall supports human rights.
The CIRI data also included a physical integrity rights index that aggregated these four categories.
For 48 resolutions, China was coded as “absent.” Therefore, the total number of resolutions for China was 656 instead of 704.
[15], 6.
This is consistent with the argument that there is a high level of voting cohesion between China and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries (e.g., [27], 1083; [9], 382). In 1991, China’s foreign minister, Qian Qichen, stated at the UNGA that the tenets of the NAM are central to Chinese foreign policy ([27], 1083). Mielniczuk sums up the main tenets as: “mutual respect for sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; non-interference; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.” [27], 1083.
Of these six cases, there were three resolutions on human rights in Afghanistan for the years 1985, 1986, and 1987. During that time, the Soviet Union was working with the Afghan government in the civil war and the resolutions contained language criticizing the foreign involvement or “foreign forces.” There were two resolutions on “Occupied Kuwait,” regarding Saddam Hussein’s invasion of that country. The remaining resolution was on Guatemala.
[40], 61.
If we drop the resolutions on Israel from country-specific resolutions, China’s favoring ratio of human rights was fairly low and flat since the early 1990s.
[36], 55.
E.g., [32].
[31], 16.
[43].
Relatedly, this decline in China’s support of human rights in the early 1990s can be its strategic response to (i.e., to deflect) the foreign criticisms of the Tiananmen Square incident. We thank a reviewer for suggesting this point.
We thank a reviewer for suggesting the comparison of the UNSC permanent members’ voting on human rights in the UNGA.
[9], 380.
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Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Robbie Barnett, Jack Donnelly, Andy Nathan, Nancy Chunjuan Wei, Liz Wishnick, and two excellent reviewers for their helpful suggestions.
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Primiano, C.B., Xiang, J. Voting in the UN: a Second Image of China’s Human Rights. J OF CHIN POLIT SCI 21, 301–319 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-016-9399-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-016-9399-x