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Review of empirical research on rotation and non-audit services: auditor independence in fact vs. appearance

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Abstract

Confidence in the processes of corporate reporting and auditing has rapidly decreased recently due to front-page accounting scandals in both the United States and Europe. The goal of audit regulations, such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the United States (US) and the 8th Directive in the European Union (EU), is to restore public trust in the auditing process. Along with other regulatory aspects, requirements related to audit partner rotation and bans on providing concurrent non-audit services were implemented to maintain auditor independence, both in fact and in appearance. However, the implementation of audit regulation implies that increased requirements are able to enhance the failed audit function. Empirical research should help to understand the impact of these two regulatory aspects and indicate their effectiveness in maintaining auditor independence. Thus, we outline the newest empirical research related to audit partner rotation and non-audit services and independence in fact or in appearance. Overall, we conclude that prior research does not point to one particular requirement that would most effectively restore trust in the audit function. Rather the existence of multiple threats to auditor independence might demand a combination of several requirements to maintain auditor independence. Thus, more research is needed to investigate the joint effects of different threats to auditor independence, e. g., non-audit fees and audit partner tenure.

Zusammenfassung

Durch Bilanzskandale in den USA und Europa wurde das Vertrauen in die Unternehmens-berichterstattung und die Abschlussprüfung stark erschüttert. Das Ziel von Gesetzesinitiativen wie der Sarbanes-Oxley Act in den USA und der 8. EU-Richtlinie ist daher die Wiederherstellung des Vertrauens in die Abschlussprüferfunktion. Neben anderen regulatorischen Maßnahmen betreffen die gesetzliche Änderungen die Rotation des verantwortlichen Prüfungspartners und das Verbot, bestimmte Nicht-Prüfungsleistungen für Prüfungsmandanten zu erbringen. Diese Regelungen wurden implementiert, um ,,auditor independence in fact‘‘ und ,,auditor independence in appearance‘‘ zu erhalten. Die Einführung der gesetzlichen Anforderungen impliziert ex ante, dass die jeweiligen gesetzlichen Bestimmungen in der Lage sind, die deutlich in Kritik geratene Abschlussprüferfunktion zu stabilisieren. Empirische Forschungsergebnisse können in diesem Zusammenhang dazu dienen, den Einfluss der drei oben genannten gesetzlichen Änderungen im Hinblick auf die Erhaltung der Abschlussprüferunabhängigkeit zu beurteilen. Daher stellt dieser Beitrag die neueste empirische Forschung zur Abschlussprüferrotation und zu Nicht-Prüfungsleistungen in Bezug auf ,,auditor independence in fact‘‘ und ,,auditor independence in appearance‘‘ vor. Insgesamt lassen die empirischen Befunde keine Aussage darüber zu, welcher spezifische Regulierungsaspekt zur Wiederherstellung des Vertrauens in die Abschlussprüfung beiträgt. Vielmehr könnte das gleichzeitige Vorliegen verschiedener Bedrohungen für die Abschlussprüferunabhängigkeit eine Kombination verschiedener regulatorischer Maßnahmen erforderlich machen. Um diesen Zusammenhang zu untersuchen, sind jedoch weitere empirische Untersuchungen nötig, die sich gezielt mit der gleichzeitigen Auswirkung der Rotation des verantwortlichen Prüfungspartners und dem Verbot, bestimmte Nicht-Prüfungsleistungen zu erbringen, auseinandersetzen.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Unternehmensrechnung und -besteuerung, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Universitätsstr. 14–16, 48143, Münster, Germany

    Christiane Pott

  2. Anderson Graduate School of Management, University of California, 900 University Avenue, California 92521, Riverside, USA

    Theodore J. Mock

  3. Institut für Unternehmensrechnung und -besteuerung, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Universitätsstr. 14–16, 48143, Münster, Germany

    Christoph Watrin

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  1. Christiane Pott
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Correspondence to Christiane Pott.

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Pott, C., Mock, T. & Watrin, C. Review of empirical research on rotation and non-audit services: auditor independence in fact vs. appearance . J Betriebswirtsch 58, 209–239 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11301-009-0043-0

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