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Experimentelle Forschung in der Budgetierung – Lügen, nichts als Lügen?

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Zusammenfassung

Die Budgetierung ist eines der wichtigsten Planungs-, Kontroll- und Koordinationsinstrumente in dezentralisierten Unternehmen. Methoden der partizipativen Budgetierung erlauben dabei der Unternehmenszentrale zum einen die Nutzung der Informationen der besser informierten Bereichsmanager, ermöglichen diesen jedoch zum anderen, ihren Informationsvorsprung zum Aufbau von Slack zu nutzen. Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt Experimente vor, die das Verhalten der Akteure in partizipativen Budgetierungsprozessen analysieren. Er geht dabei der Frage nach, in welchem Maße das Verhalten der Akteure einerseits von Eigennutzmaximierung beeinflusst wird und welche Rolle andererseits nicht standardtheoretische Präferenzen z.B. für das Wohlergehen anderer oder für Ehrlichkeit spielen.

Abstract

Budgeting is one of the most important instruments for planning, control and coordination in decentralized firms. Participative budgeting allows a firm’s headquarters to make use of the divisional managers’ superior information when formulating budgets, but, simultaneously, gives the managers the opportunity to benefit from their superior information and to build slack into their budgets. This paper presents experiments analyzing the behavior in participative budgeting processes and explores the question how the actors’ behavior is influenced by pure self-interest on the one hand and non-standard preferences e.g. for the well-being of others or for honesty on the other hand.

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  1. Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, 37073, Göttingen, Deutschland

    Markus C. Arnold

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Arnold, M. Experimentelle Forschung in der Budgetierung – Lügen, nichts als Lügen?. JfB 57, 69–99 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11301-007-0021-3

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