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Der Einfluss von Corporate Governance auf die Determinanten und Effekte von Investitionen

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Zusammenfassung

Der vorliegende Überblicksartikel kommt zu dem Schluss, dass das Corporate-Governance-Umfeld einer Firma den Zusammenhang zwischen den Investitionen (I) und Cash Flows (CF) und damit die Investitionsrenditen beeinflusst. Beide Erklärungsansätze für positive I-CF-Sensitivitäten – die Theorie der asymmetrischen Informationen (TAI) als auch die Manager-Diskretions-Theorie (MDT) – finden empirische Unterstützung in Unter-Stichproben von Firmen. Die TAI erscheint wahrscheinlicher für junge, kleine und familienkontrollierte Firmen. Enge Banken-Firmen-Beziehungen reduzieren Finanzierungsrestriktionen. Wesentliche Bestimmungsfaktoren der I-CF-Sensitivität sind auch die Rechtstradition des Landes, in der sich die Firma befindet, die Qualität des Rechnungswesens und die Eigentümerstruktur der Firma. Die empirische Evidenz über die Schätzung von Investitionsrenditen ist ebenfalls konsistent mit der Aussage, dass manche Firmen unterinvestieren (müssen), während andere überinvestieren.

Abstract

This survey concludes that corporate governance has an effect on the investment (I) – cash flow (CF) sensitivity and thus on rates of return on investment. Both theories explaining positive I-CF sensitivities – the asymmetric information theory (AIT) and the managerial discretion theory (MDT) – are empirically validated in sub-samples of firms. The AIT appears more likely for young, small and family-controlled firms. Relations between banks and firms reduce financial constraints. Important determinants of I-CF sensitivity also include the legal system, the quality of accounting standards as well as the firm’s ownership structure. Empirical estimates of rates of return on investment are also consistent with the notion that some firms (must) under-invest, while other firms over-invest.

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  1. Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, BWZ, Universität Wien, Brünner Strasse 72, 1210, Wien, Österreich

    Klaus Gugler

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  1. Klaus Gugler
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Gugler, K. Der Einfluss von Corporate Governance auf die Determinanten und Effekte von Investitionen. JfB 55, 113–143 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11301-005-0004-1

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