Mind & Society

, Volume 14, Issue 1, pp 21–33

Conscious belief as constructed memory: an empirical challenge to dispositionalism

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11299-014-0156-6

Cite this article as:
Sridharan, V. Mind Soc (2015) 14: 21. doi:10.1007/s11299-014-0156-6
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Abstract

There is an emerging consensus that human behavior is governed by two types of processes: System 1 processes, which are quicker, automatic, and run in parallel, and System 2 (S2) processes, which are slower, more conscious, and run in serial. Among such “dual-process” theorists, however, there is disagreement about whether the premises we use in our conscious, S2 reasoning should be considered as beliefs. In this exchange, one facet that has been largely overlooked is how conscious beliefs are structurally and functionally similar to episodic memories. This article will argue that the similarities between beliefs and episodic memories, specifically in light of Daniel Schacter’s widely influential constructive memory framework, highlight a heretofore unexamined empirical weakness of dispositional accounts of S2 beliefs. In addition, this perspective helps situate beliefs within our broader understanding of how information is encoded and retrieved in the brain.

Keywords

Belief Memory Dual-process theories of mind Propositional attitudes Dispositional beliefs Episodic memory 

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.OaklandUSA

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