This study investigated the role of self-selection in an evaluation of the impact of a focused deterrence notification meeting on subsequent arrests.
We conducted a randomized controlled study that randomly assigned probationers and parolees to a treatment group asked to attend a focused deterrence notification meeting and a control group that was not asked to attend the meeting. A sizable proportion of the treatment group did not attend the meeting. We estimated intent-to-treat, average treatment, and local average treatment models to evaluate the effect of attending the notification meeting on future arrests and the effect of self-selection on the results.
Subjects who attended the notification meeting were less likely than those who did not receive treatment to be arrested over the following 17 months. The results were not significantly affected by selection effects.
Future evaluations of focused deterrence and related criminal justice interventions should be based on randomized controlled research designs that address selection effects on the outcome.
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Additional missing data further reduced the sample size in some analyses, as noted in the presentation of results.
All model and test results were estimated in STATA 13.1.
All results not shown are available from the authors on request.
We acknowledge concerns regarding the application of OLS and related linear models to dichotomous outcomes. Angrist (2006) defends the use of such models, however, when dichotomous indicators appear on both sides of the equation.
We re-estimated the models without covariates on the 103 cases used for the models including the covariates. The results are nearly identical to those presented in Table 4.
We conducted a similar comparison of subjects who attended the notification meeting (the compliers in the treatment group) with those who did not attend the meeting (the noncompliers in the treatment group + the control group). The results were nearly identical to those reported.
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Hamilton, B., Rosenfeld, R. & Levin, A. Opting out of treatment: Self-selection bias in a randomized controlled study of a focused deterrence notification meeting. J Exp Criminol 14, 1–17 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-017-9309-z
- Focused deterrence
- Notification meeting
- Randomized controlled experiment
- Selection effects