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, Volume 106, Issue 1, pp 85–117 | Cite as

Why Cryptosystems Fail Revisited

  • Geir M. KøienEmail author
Article
  • 47 Downloads

Abstract

In the paper “Why Cryptosystems Fail”, Ross Anderson ponders the question about why cryptosystems really fail. Obviously, there may be weak crypto-algorithms, too short key lengths and flawed crypto-protocols. However, these were not the main reason why cryptosystems failed. Anderson discovered that the problem had more to do with misplaced trust and misconceptions of the threats the systems faced. Now, more than 25 years later, it seems prudent to revisit the question of why cryptosystems fail. We investigate the original paper, and evaluate to what extent the situation is similar today.

Keywords

Cryptosystems Failure Threat model Mental model Cryptography Security controls Trust Assumptions Human factors Skills shortage 

Notes

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of AgderKristiansandNorway

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