Abstract
How to solve the psychological repetition crisis is a challenge of social science. In this paper, we propose a double hypothesis to explore why so many psychological studies cannot be replicated. Social phenomenon is emotional and subjective, while cognitive and physiological phenomena are relatively objective, which leads to the low success rate of the previous researches on repetition. To test this hypothesis, this article use the topic model to analyze and theme model published in one of the most famous journal of psychology 100 articles (sampling 100 articles from the journal psychological science journals and try to copy them, but not in most cases), and it shows that the results do not support the hypothesis of dual psychology shows that the repeatability is closely related to the essence of the object.
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Fei, D. The Repeatability in Psychology: A Topic Model Approach. Wireless Pers Commun 103, 983–989 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-018-5491-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-018-5491-1