Water Resources Management

, Volume 28, Issue 9, pp 2677–2694 | Cite as

Stakeholders’ Responses to the Use of Innovative Water Trading Systems in East Anglia, England

  • D. M. LumbrosoEmail author
  • C. Twigger-Ross
  • J. Raffensperger
  • J. J. Harou
  • M. Silcock
  • A. J. K. Thompson


It is widely recognised that the current abstraction licensing system in England needs to be reformed to meet the challenges of future environmental flow requirements, likely increases in water demands and climate change. The UK Government has committed to the reform of the abstraction regime in England and work is underway, including the Welsh Government, to assess the impacts of different reform options, working closely with stakeholders. International experience reveals that the complexity of water management at a national level lends itself to common principles but ultimately that local solutions are required at a catchment-level to manage such challenges. Historically the number of abstraction licences traded in England is negligible. In the future the trading of abstraction licences and derivative water rights, for example water quotas, could play a key role in improving water use efficiency. This paper describes research that was carried out to add to this evidence base in the Upper Ouse and Bedford Ouse catchment in East Anglia with a number of stakeholders to document their response to two innovative water trading systems which have been termed “improved pair-wise” trading and the “common pool” approach. Improved pair-wise trading would allow for a hierarchy of types of short-term abstraction licence trades. Some trades between specific points in a catchment might be pre-approved if the risks to the environment were deemed acceptable. The common pool approach is based on the trading of water quotas, using “smart market” methods, which enable economic optimisation of market outcomes based on abstractors’ bids subject to realistic hydrological constraints. This method would allow all abstractors to bid into a common pool on a weekly basis to obtain their water. Both methods were demonstrated via two workshops to investigate the barriers and facilitators to water trading in practice. Participants were cautiously interested in the benefits offered by both methods, especially the ability to trade water at short notice. However, for these trading methods to play a key role in the reform of abstraction licensing the abstractors must have sufficient confidence that the underlying methods are sufficiently equitable, reliable and accurate.


Abstraction licensing Abstractors Stakeholder participation Water markets Water trading 



The authors would like to express their gratitude to Anglian Water and Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) who financed this research and especially Jean Spencer who provided invaluable support and guidance. The authors also wish to acknowledge the valuable comments of the Working Group that steered this research which included: Anglian Water, University of Cambridge Programme for Sustainability Leadership, Defra, NFU, the Royal Agricultural Society of England, Natural England, the Environment Agency, Ofwat, WWF-UK, Association of Drainage Authorities, Cranfield University, Atkins, the RSPB and the Broads Authority and also all the stakeholders in the region who were engaged as part of the research.


This paper reflects the views of the authors and should not be construed to represent the views or policies of Defra, Anglian Water or any other members of the Working Group that provided either funding or advice to the authors.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • D. M. Lumbroso
    • 1
    Email author
  • C. Twigger-Ross
    • 2
  • J. Raffensperger
    • 3
  • J. J. Harou
    • 4
    • 6
  • M. Silcock
    • 5
  • A. J. K. Thompson
    • 5
  1. 1.HR WallingfordWallingfordUK
  2. 2.Collingwood Environmental PlanningLondonUK
  3. 3.JFR Decision Research Ltd.Santa MonicaUSA
  4. 4.School of Mechanical, Aerospace and Civil EngineeringUniversity of ManchesterManchesterUK
  5. 5.Anglian WaterHuntingdonUK
  6. 6.Department of Civil, Environmental and Geomatic EngineeringUniversity College LondonLondonUK

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