Abstract
This paper presents a procedure for decision analysis in water use conflicts among irrigators. It seeks feasible compromise term among decision makers by using optimal results for different proposals of solutions. The process is developed by applying the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution. The case study is the existing conflict among Coqueiros canal water users. This 45 km canal belongs to a complex irrigation and drainage canal network and it is located at Campos dos Goytacazes municipality, in the northern region of the State of Rio de Janeiro. Its basin has a potential irrigable area of approximately 14,000 ha. Six hypothetical scenarios have been built, each one corresponding to different alternatives to the conflict solution. In addition, two different tendencies were adopted by the Management Institution (MI) in order to take care of the conflict. The first tendency takes into account that the MI has no explicit preferences for any of its actions. As for the second one, the MI shows explicit preferences for the scenarios which provide more income taxes. Some scenarios that reached the state of equilibrium were analyzed to provide solutions to the conflict.
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Getirana, A.C.V., Malta, V.d.F. & de Azevedo, J.P.S. Decision Process in a Water Use Conflict in Brazil. Water Resour Manage 22, 103–118 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-006-9146-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-006-9146-8