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Funding Civil Society? Bilateral Government Support for Development NGOs

  • David Suárez
  • Mary Kay Gugerty
Original Paper

Abstract

Research on the determinants of foreign aid tends to focus on the relationship between donor country priorities and recipient state characteristics, but donors also make decisions about which organizations and programs within countries will receive assistance. Although NGOs increasingly have been recipients of foreign aid, few data are available to investigate which organizations within a given country receive that funding. Donors may prioritize structural characteristics of NGOs or their local ties—or they may seek a combination that blends concern about efficiency and accountability with an interest in developing national civil society. We use original data from Cambodia to explore whether aid is likely to go to managerial organizations (professionalized NGOs and NGOs that utilize modern management tools) or to organizations that are embedded in the domestic context. We argue that managerialism provides legitimacy for NGOs by signaling capacity and accountability to donors, increasing the likelihood of government funding. We argue that local embeddedness also confers legitimacy by aligning community ties and networks to rights-based development, increasing the likelihood of government funding. We find general support for the managerialism argument, but donor agencies do not prioritize direct funding for “indigenous” NGOs—not even among those with high levels of managerialism.

Keywords

Nonprofit NGO Management Development Civil society Foreign aid 

Résumé

Les recherches sur les déterminants de l’aide étrangère ont tendance à se concentrer sur la relation entre les priorités des pays donateurs et les caractéristiques des États bénéficiaires, tandis que les donateurs prennent aussi des décisions sur les organismes et les programmes des pays qui recevront une assistance. Bien que les ONG soient de plus en plus bénéficiaires de l’aide étrangère, peu d’informations sont disponibles pour déterminer quelles organisations dans un pays donné reçoivent ce financement. Les donateurs peuvent accorder la priorité aux caractéristiques structurelles des ONG ou à leurs liens locaux, ou chercher une combinaison qui allie l’efficacité et la responsabilité qui présentent un intérêt pour le développement de la société civile nationale. Nous utilisons les données originales du Cambodge pour étudier si l’aide a tendance à être consacrée à des organismes gestionnaires (les ONG professionnalisées et les ONG qui utilisent des outils modernes de gestion) ou à des organisations qui sont intégrées dans un contexte national. Nous montrons que le managérialisme donne une légitimité aux ONG en indiquant leur capacité et leur responsabilité aux donateurs, ce qui augmente la probabilité de financements publics. Nous affirmons que l’implantation locale confère également une légitimité en harmonisant les liens communautaires et les réseaux avec le développement axé sur les droits, ce qui augmente aussi la probabilité de financements publics. Nous constatons un soutien général pour l’argument du managérialisme, mais les organismes donateurs ne donnent pas la priorité des financements directs aux ONG « indigènes » — pas même parmi celles dotées de niveaux élevés de managérialisme.

Zusammenfassung

Forschungsarbeiten zu den Einflussfaktoren für ausländische Hilfe konzentrieren sich in der Regel auf die Beziehung zwischen den Prioritäten des Spenderlandes und den Merkmalen des Empfängerlandes; doch treffen Spender auch Entscheidungen darüber, welche Organisationen und Programme innerhalb eines Landes Unterstützung erhalten. Obwohl nicht-staatliche Organisationen zunehmend zu den Empfängern ausländischer Hilfe zählen, stehen nur wenige Daten zur Verfügung, anhand derer untersucht werden kann, welche Organisationen innerhalb des jeweiligen Landes die Geldmittel erhalten. Spender priorisieren unter Umständen nach strukturellen Merkmalen der nicht-staatlichen Organisationen oder ihren lokalen Verbindungen - oder sie suchen eine Kombination, die die Frage der Effizienz und Rechenschaft mit einem Interesse an der Entwicklung einer nationalen Bürgergesellschaft vereint. Wir stützen uns auf Originaldaten aus Kambodscha, um zu untersuchen, ob Hilfeleistungen aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach an managerhaften Organisationen (professionalisierte nicht-staatliche Organisationen und nicht-staatliche Organisationen, die moderne Management-Tools anwenden) oder an Organisationen geht, die im inländischen Kontext integriert sind. Wir behaupten, dass der Managerialismus den nicht-staatlichen Organisationen zur Legitimität verhilft, indem er Spendern Kapazität und Rechenschaft signalisiert, was die Wahrscheinlichkeit für eine staatliche finanzielle Unterstützung erhöht. Wir behaupten weiterhin, dass auch die lokale Integration Legitimität verleiht, indem sie Gemeindeverbindungen und Netzwerke an eine rechtsbasierende Entwicklung angleicht, was ebenfalls die Wahrscheinlichkeit für eine staatliche finanzielle Unterstützung erhöht. Wir sehen allgemeine Belege für das Managerialismus-Argument; doch die Spenderinstitutionen geben direkten Mitteln an „einheimische“nicht-staatliche Organisationen keine Priorität - auch nicht, wenn die Organisationen ein hohes Maß an Managerialimus aufweisen.

Resumen

La investigación sobre los determinantes de la ayuda extranjera tiende a centrarse en la relación entre las prioridades del país donante y las características estatales del receptor, pero los donantes también toman decisiones sobre qué organizaciones y programas dentro de los países recibirán asistencia. Aunque las ONG han sido receptoras cada vez más de la ayuda extranjera, hay disponibles pocos datos para investigar qué organizaciones dentro de un país dado reciben qué financiación. Los donantes pueden priorizar las características estructurales de las ONG o sus lazos locales - o pueden buscar una combinación que aúne la preocupación sobre la eficiencia y la responsabilidad con un interés en desarrollar la sociedad civil nacional. Utilizamos datos originales de Camboya para explorar si es probable que la ayuda vaya a organizaciones gerenciales (ONG profesionalizadas y ONG que utilizan herramientas de gestión modernas) o a organizaciones que estén arraigadas en el contexto doméstico. Argumentamos que el gerencialismo proporciona legitimidad a las ONG señalando su capacidad y responsabilidad ante los donantes, aumentando la probabilidad de financiación gubernamental. Argumentamos que el arraigo local confiere también legitimidad alineando los lazos comunitarios y las redes al desarrollo basado en derechos, aumentando la probabilidad de financiación gubernamental. Encontramos un apoyo general al argumento del gerencialismo, pero las agencias donantes no priorizan la financiación directa para ONG “indígenas” - incluso entre aquellas con niveles elevados de gerencialismo.

摘要

有关对外援助的决定因素的研究常常集中在捐赠国的优先事项和接受国的特点两者之间的关系上, 但是捐赠国也会做出由国内哪些机构和项目接受援助的决定,虽然非政府组织越来越成为对外援助的对象,但是研究某个国家的哪个机构接受资助进行调查时,可以利用的数据却很少。 捐助人可能优先考虑非政府组织的结构特点或他们在当地的联系—或者他们会将对效率和责任心的关注和对发展国家的公民社会的兴趣结合起来考虑。我们利用来自柬埔寨的原始数据来探讨援助是否有可能进入管理机构(专业化的非政府组织和利用现代管理工具的非政府组织)或根植于国内环境的机构。我们认为管理主义通过向捐助人发出能力和责任心的信号从而为非政府组织提供合法性。增加了政府提供资金支持的可能性。我们认为在本地稳扎稳打也可以通过将社区联系和网络和基于权利的发展对齐从而赋予合法性,增加政府资助的可能性。我们发现对管理主义论点在总体上是支持态度, 但是捐助机构没有优先考虑对本土的非政府组织优先提供直接的资金支持, 甚至是具备高水平管理主义的非政府组织也不例外。

要約

対外援助の規定因に関する研究は、資金提供国の優先順位と受領国の状況の特性との関係に焦点を当てやすいが、資金提供者はまた国内のプログラムと組織から援助を受ける決定も行っている。NGOは海外支援者を増加させてきたが、特定国の組織が資金受領国の組織についてのデータはほとんどない。資金提供者は、NGOや地元関係の構造特性の優先順位、または効率性と国内の市民社会の進展に関心を持つ説明責任の懸念についての混合の組み合わせを求めることができる。カンボジアの元データを使用して、援助が経営組織 (専門化したNGO、現代管理ツールを活用したNGO)になりやすいか、または国内に定着した組織に移動する可能性が高いかどうかを調査する。管理主義が政府の資金調達の可能性の増加によるNGOの合法性の提供を議論する。地域への定着は、コミュニティの関係と人権に基づく進展へのネットワークの連携を正当化して、政府の資金調達の可能性を高めることを主張する。管理主義の議論に対する一般的なサポートが明らかになったが、資金提供機関は高レベルの管理者でもなく、「元祖」NGOへの直接の資金調達が優先されないことがわかった。

ملخص

البحث عن محددات المساعدات الأجنبية يميل إلى التركيزعلى العلاقة بين أولويات البلدان المانحة وخصائص الدولة المتلقية، لكن الجهات المانحة أيضا” تتخذ قرارات بشأن أي منظمات وبرامج داخل البلدان التي سوف تتلقى مساعدة.على الرغم من أن المنظمات الغيرحكومية (NGOs) كانت على نحو متزايد متلقيين للمساعدات الأجنبية، تتوفر بيانات قليلة للتحقق من أي المنظمات في بلد معين تتلقى هذا التمويل. قد يضع الممولين أولويات لهيكلة خصائص المنظمات الغير حكومية (NGOs) أو العلاقات المحلية - أو أنها قد تسعى إلى مجموعة التي تمزج القلق حول الكفاءة والمساءلة التي لها مصلحة في تطوير المجتمع المدني الوطني. نحن نستخدم البيانات الأصلية من كمبوديا لإكتشاف إذا كانت المعونة من المرجح أن تذهب إلى منظمات إدارية (المنظمات الغير حكومية (NGOs) ذات الصفات المهنية والمنظمات الغير حكومية (NGOs) التي تستخدم أدوات الإدارة الحديثة) أو المنظمات التي هي جزء لا يتجزأ في السياق المحلي. نحن نجادل أن المنظمات ذات النهج الإداري توفر الشرعية للمنظمات الغير حكومية (NGOs) خلال الإشارة إلى القدرات والمساءلة للجهات المانحة، مما يزيد من إحتمال التمويل الحكومي. نحن نجادل أن الدرجة التي يتم تقييد النشاط الاقتصادي المحلي يمنح أيضا شرعية عن طريق مواءمة علاقات المجتمع والشبكات في التنمية القائمة على الحقوق، وزيادة إحتمالات التمويل الحكومي. نجد الدعم العام لجدل المنظمات ذات النهج الإداري ، لكن الوكالات المانحة لا تضع أولويات للتمويل المباشر للمنظمات الغير حكومية (NGOs) “الأصلية” - ليس حتى من بين الذين لديهم مستويات عالية من النهج الإداري.

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Copyright information

© International Society for Third-Sector Research and The Johns Hopkins University 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Evans School of Public Policy & GovernanceUniversity of WashingtonSeattleUSA

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