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Cooperative Attitudes Among Workers of Social Cooperatives: Evidence from an Artefactual Field Experiment

  • Luigi Mittone
  • Matteo PlonerEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

We investigate cooperative attitudes among workers of nonprofit organizations by means of a novel empirical method combining experimental and survey data. Specifically, a two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma game is attached to a nationwide survey of social cooperatives in Italy. We experimentally manipulate social proximity of those interacting in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the relative returns of mutual cooperation. We find that higher returns foster cooperation when social proximity of participants is low, while cooperation is not affected by a change in social proximity alone. Furthermore, social relations in the workplace and innate dispositional factors correlate with choices in the game. Our findings offer stimulating insights into the interplay between organizational features and workers’ motivations.

Keywords

Cooperation Field experiments Social Dilemmas Nonprofit organizations 

Résumé

Au moyen d’une nouvelle méthode empirique qui associe les données expérimentales et issues d’enquêtes, nous étudions les attitudes coopératives chez les travailleurs d’associations à but non lucratif. Précisément, un jeu du dilemme du prisonnier à deux joueurs est associé à une étude nationale portant sur les coopératives sociales en Italie. Nous manipulons expérimentalement la proximité sociale des personnes qui interagissent dans le dilemme du prisonnier et les récompenses relatives associées à la coopération mutuelle. Nous déterminons que des récompenses élevées encouragent la coopération quand la proximité sociale des participants est faible, alors qu’un changement de proximité sociale uniquement n’influe pas sur la coopération. De plus, on observe une corrélation des choix dans le jeu avec les relations sociales sur le lieu de travail et les facteurs dispositionnels innés. Nos découvertes donnent un aperçu intéressant de l’interaction qui existe entre les caractéristiques organisationnelles et les motivations des travailleurs.

Zusammenfassung

Wir untersuchen die kooperative Haltung von Mitarbeitern in Nonprofit organisationen mittels einer neuen empirischen Methode, bei der experimentelle Daten und Umfragedaten kombiniert werden. Hierzu wird einer landesweiten Befragung von sozialen Genossenschaften in Italien das für zwei Spieler vorgesehene Spiel Gefangenendilemma hinzugefügt. Wir manipulieren experimentell die soziale Nähe der am Spiel beteiligten Personen sowie die relativen Gewinne bei gegenseitiger Kooperation. Wir stellen fest, dass höhere Gewinne die Kooperation fördern, wenn die soziale Nähe der Teilnehmer gering ist, während sich eine Änderung der sozialen Nähe allein nicht auf die Kooperation auswirkt. Des Weiteren stehen soziale Beziehungen am Arbeitsplatz und immanente dispositionelle Faktoren mit den Spielentscheidungen in einer Wechselbeziehung. Unsere Ergebnisse bieten anregende Erkenntnisse über die Wechselwirkung zwischen Organisationsmerkmalen und den Motivationen der Mitarbeiter.

Resumen

Investigamos las actitudes cooperativas entre trabajadores de organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro mediante un novedoso método empírico que combina datos experimentales y de encuestas. Específicamente, se añade un juego de Dilema del Prisionero de dos jugadores a una encuesta a nivel nacional de cooperativas sociales en Italia. Manipulamos experimentalmente la proximidad social de aquellos que interactúan en el Dilema del Prisionero y los beneficios relativos de la cooperación mutua. Encontramos que los beneficios más elevados fomentan la cooperación cuando la proximidad social de los participantes es baja, mientras que la cooperación no se ve afectada por un cambio en la proximidad social solamente. Asimismo, las relaciones sociales en el lugar de trabajo y los factores disposicionales innatos se correlacionan con las elecciones en el juego. Nuestros hallazgos ofrecen ideas estimulantes sobre la interacción entre las características organizativas y las motivaciones de los trabajadores.

摘要

通过组合经验和调查数据的全新经验方法,我们调查了非盈利组织员工之间的合作态度。具体来说,双人囚犯的困境游戏被附加到意大利的全国社会合作调查。我们尝试操纵那些与囚犯的困境交互人员的社会亲密程度,以及共同合作的相对返回。我们发现,当参与者的社会亲密程度较低时,返回更高的增强合作;同时,合作不仅仅受社会亲密程度变化的营销。此外,工作场所和固有意向因素的社会关系与游戏的选择相关。我们的发现提供了组织特点和员工动机之间的相互作用的有益内幕。

要約

経験的手法と調査データが結合した実験による検討データを用いて、 非営利団体の労働者間の協調的態度を調査する。具体的には、イタリアの社会的協同組合の全国調査に2 人用プレーヤーの囚人のジレンマゲームを添付する。囚人のジレンマにおいて相互作用の社会的な近接さと相互協力による想定的なリターンを実験的に与える。協力関係は社会的近接さのみで変更の影響を受けないが、参加者の社会的な近接さが低い場合、協力し合えればハイリターンを得られる。さらに、職場での社会関係と生来の気質要因はゲームの選択肢から関連付けられる。調査結果から、組織の機能と労働者の動機における相互作用に刺激的な洞察力を提示することがわかった。

ملخص

نحن نفحص المواقف التعاونية بين العاملين في المنظمات الغير هادفة للربح عن طريق منهج الرواية التجريبية التي تجمع بين البيانات التجريبية وإستطلاع الرأي. على وجه التحديد، مرفق لعبة معضلة السجين لإثنين من اللاعبين لإستطلاع رأي وطني للتعاونيات الإجتماعية في إيطاليا. نحن تجريبيا˝ نعالج ببراعة القرب الإجتماعي من المتفاعلين في معضلة السجين والعوائد النسبية للتعاون المتبادل. نجد أن عائدات أعلى لتعزيز التعاون عندما يكون القرب الإجتماعي للمشاركين منخفض، في حين لا يتأثر التعاون عن تغيير في القرب الإجتماعي وحده. علاوة على ذلك،عوامل العلاقات الاجتماعية في مكان العمل الأساسي الترتيبي ترتبط مع الخيارات في اللعبة. تقدم النتائج التي توصلناإليها نظرة ثاقبة لتحفيز التفاعل بين السمات التنظيمية ودوافع العمال.

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Copyright information

© International Society for Third-Sector Research and The Johns Hopkins University 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.DEM-CEELUniversity of TrentoTrentoItaly

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