Proper Names, Rigidity, and Empirical Studies on Judgments of Identity Across Transformations
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The question of transtemporal identity of objects in general and persons in particular is an important issue in both philosophy and psychology. While the focus of philosophers traditionally was on questions of the nature of identity relation and criteria that allow to settle ontological issues about identity, psychologists are mostly concerned with how people think about identity, and how they track identity of objects and people through time. In this article, we critically engage with widespread use of inferring folk judgments of identity from study participants’ use of proper names in response to experimental vignettes. We provide reasons to doubt that using this method one can reliably infer judgments of numerical identity over time and transformations. We also critically examine allegedly-Kripkean justification of this method and find it lacking. Merely assuming that names are rigid designators will not help. A study participant’s use of proper names can be taken to track the participant’s identity judgments only if supported by the participant’s belief that names used in the scenario are used rigidly.
KeywordsProper names Rigidity Personal identity Individual identity Saul Kripke
An earlier version of this paper was presented at Vilnius University, University of Warsaw, Boğaziçi University, University of Helsinki, and Academia Grammaticorum Salensis. We wish to thank the audiences at these events for suggestions on how to improve the paper. We also thank two anonymous reviewers for this journal for their valuable suggestions.
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Conflict of interest
The author(s) declare that they have no competing interests.
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