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Inference and Epistemic Transparency

  • Gabriele Usberti


In his paper “Explaining Deductive Inference” Prawitz states what he calls «a fundamental problem of logic and the philosophy of logic»: the problem of explaining «Why do certain inferences have the epistemic power to confer evidence on the conclusion when applied to premisses for which there is evidence already?». In this paper I suggest a way of articulating, and partly modifying, the intuitionistic answer to this problem in such a way as to both answer Prawitz’s problem and satisfy a requirement I argue to be crucial for any epistemic theory of the meaning of the logical constants: the requirement that evidence is epistemically transparent.


Inference Intuitionism Theory of grounds Prawitz Epistemic transparency Heyting 


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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.DISPOC (Dipartimento di Scienze sociali, politiche e cognitive)Università degli Studi di SienaSienaItaly

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