, Volume 37, Issue 4, pp 603–606 | Cite as

Impartiality and Realism: Reply to Mancuso

  • David EnochEmail author


In Chapter 2 of Taking Morality Seriously, I put forward an argument for morality's objectivity that is based on the (purported) first-order implications of denying such objectivity. In her contribution to this volume, Mancuso criticizes that argument. This paper is a response to some of her main points.


Objectivity Moral realism Impartiality Moral explanations 


  1. Björnsson G, Olinder F (2016) Enoch’s defense of robust meta-ethical realism. J Moral Philos 13:101–112CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Enoch D (2011) Taking morality seriously. A defense of robust realism. Oxford University Press, New YorkCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Mancuso G (2017) Enoch’s “taking-morality-seriously thought” unpacked and at work in the argument from impartiality. Topoi. doi: 10.1007/s11245-016-9449-1 CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Hebrew University of JerusalemJerusalemIsrael

Personalised recommendations