pp 1–10 | Cite as

Making Room for a This-Worldly Physicalism

  • Barbara Gail Montero
  • Chris Brown


Physicalism is thought to entail that mental properties supervene on microphysical properties, or in other words that all God had to do was to create the fundamental physical properties and the rest came along for free. In this paper, we question the all-god-had-to-do reflex.


Physicalism Materialism Supervenience Kripke Mind Dualism 


  1. Bedau M, Humphreys P (2008) Emergence: contemporary readings in philosophy and science. MIT Press, CambridgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Bennett K (2009) Composition, colocation, and metaontology. In Chalmers DJ, Manley D, Wasserman R (eds) Metametaphysics: new essays on the foundations of ontology. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  3. Block N, Stalnaker R (1999) Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap. Philos Rev 108(1):1–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Brakel J van (2000) Philosophy of chemistry: between the manifest and the scientific image. University Press, Leuven, pp 119–150Google Scholar
  5. Cameron R (2007) The contingency of composition. Philos Stud 136(1):99–121CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Chalmers D (1996) The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  7. Chalmers D (2009) The two-dimensional argument against materialism. In McLaughlin BP, Walter S (eds) Oxford handbook to the philosophy of mind. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  8. Hempel C (1969) Reduction: ontological and linguistic facets. In: Morgenbesser S, Suppes P, White M (eds) Philosophy, science, and method: essays in honor of ernest nagel. St. Martins Press, New York, pp 179–199Google Scholar
  9. Hendry R (Forthcoming) The metaphysics of chemistry. New York. OxfordGoogle Scholar
  10. Hill CS, Mclaughlin BP (1999) There are fewer things in reality than are dreamt of in Chalmers's philosophy. Philos Phenomenol Res 59(2):445–454CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Humphreys P (2016) Emergence. Oxford University Press, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Jackson F (1982) Epiphenomenal qualia. Philos Q 32:127–136CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Jackson F (1986) What Mary didn’t know. J Philos 83:291–295CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Jackson F (1998) From metaphysics to ethics: a defense of conceptual analysis. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  15. Jackson F (2007) A priori physicalism. In: McLaughlin BP, Cohen JD (eds) Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind. Blackwell, MaldenGoogle Scholar
  16. Jackson F (2012) Response by Frank Jackson to Barbara Gail Montero’s “Must Physicalism Imply the Supervenience of the Mental on the Physical?”. Commentary from Online Consciousness Conference, 17 Feb 2012Google Scholar
  17. Kripke S (1980) Naming and necessity. Harvard University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  18. Lewis D (1983) New work for a theory of universals. Aust J Philos 61:343–377CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Lewis D (1994) Reduction of mind. In Guttenplan S (ed) Companion to the philosophy of mind. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 412–431Google Scholar
  20. Miller K (2010) The existential quantifier, composition and contingency. Erkenntnis 73(2):211–235CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Montero BG (1999) The body problem. Noûs 33(2):183–200CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Montero BG (2007) Physicalism could be true even if Mary learns something new. Philos Q 57(227):176–189CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Montero BG (2012) Irreverent physicalism. Philos Top 40(2):91–102CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Montero BG (2013) Must physicalism imply the supervenience of the mental on the physical? J Philos 110(2):93–110CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Montero BG (2015) Physicalism. In: Garvey J (ed) The Bloomsbury companion to philosophy of mind. Bloomsbury Publishing, London, p. 92–101Google Scholar
  26. Nolan D (2005) David Lewis. Acumen Publishing, CheshamGoogle Scholar
  27. Quine WV (1981) Theories and things. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
  28. Schaffer J (2009) On what grounds what. In: Chalmers D, Manley D, Wasserman R (eds) Metametaphysics. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 247–383Google Scholar
  29. Stoljar D (2015) Physicalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of PhilosophyGoogle Scholar
  30. Witmer DG (2001) Sufficiency claims and physicalism: a formulation. In: Gillett C, Loewer B (eds) Physicalism and its discontents. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 57–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.College of Staten Island and Graduate CenterCity University of New YorkNew YorkUSA
  2. 2.Graduate Center of the City University of New YorkNew YorkUSA

Personalised recommendations