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A New Interpretation of Carnap’s Logical Pluralism

  • Teresa KouriEmail author
Article

Abstract

Rudolf Carnap’s logical pluralism is often held to be one in which corresponding connectives in different logics have different meanings. This paper presents an alternative view of Carnap’s position, in which connectives can and do share their meaning in some (though not all) contexts. This re-interpretation depends crucially on extending Carnap’s linguistic framework system to include meta-linguistic frameworks, those frameworks which we use to talk about linguistic frameworks. I provide an example that shows how this is possible, and give some textual evidence that Carnap would agree with this interpretation. Additionally, I show how this interpretation puts the Carnapian position much more in line with the position given in Shapiro (Varieties of Logic. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) than had been thought before.

Keywords

Logical pluralism Carnap Translation Stewart Shapiro 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Roy Cook, Geoffrey Hellman, Tristram McPherson, Andrew Parisi, Marcus Rossberg, Kevin Scharp, Stewart Shapiro, Neil Tennant, and a referee for helpful comments on previous drafts. Thanks also to helpful audiences at the 2016 North American Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic, the 2016 Society for Exact Philosophy, the 2016 Ohio Philosophical Association, the College of Wooster Philosophy Round Table and the Winter 2016 Dissetration Seminar at Ohio State.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.ColumbusUSA

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