Abstract
In “Divine Freedom,” I argue that morally significant incompatibilist freedom is a great good. So God possesses morally incompatibilist freedom. So, God can do wrong or at least can do worse than the best action He can do. So, God is not essentially morally perfect. After careful consideration of numerous objections, I conclude that this argument is undefeated.
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Howard-Snyder, F. Divine Freedom. Topoi 36, 651–656 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-016-9406-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-016-9406-z