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Topoi

, Volume 36, Issue 1, pp 171–181 | Cite as

Choice Points for a Modal Theory of Disjunction

  • Fabrizio Cariani
Article

Abstract

This paper investigates the prospects for a semantic theory that treats disjunction as a modal operator. Potential motivation for such a theory comes from the way in which modals (and especially, but not exclusively, epistemic modals) embed within disjunctions. After reviewing some of the relevant data, I go on to distinguish a variety of modal theories of disjunction. I analyze these theories by considering pairs of conflicting desiderata, highlighting some of the tradeoffs they must face.

Keywords

Disjunction Epistemic modals Dynamic semantics Partition semantics Context sensitivity 

Notes

Acknowledgments

For conversations and exchanges, I thank Melissa Fusco, Hanti Lin, Sarah Moss, Daniel Rothschild, Paolo Santorio, Seth Yalcin.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyNorthwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA

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