Choice Points for a Modal Theory of Disjunction Article First Online: 22 March 2016 DOI :
10.1007/s11245-015-9362-z
Cite this article as: Cariani, F. Topoi (2017) 36: 171. doi:10.1007/s11245-015-9362-z Abstract This paper investigates the prospects for a semantic theory that treats disjunction as a modal operator. Potential motivation for such a theory comes from the way in which modals (and especially, but not exclusively, epistemic modals) embed within disjunctions. After reviewing some of the relevant data, I go on to distinguish a variety of modal theories of disjunction. I analyze these theories by considering pairs of conflicting desiderata, highlighting some of the tradeoffs they must face.
Keywords Disjunction Epistemic modals Dynamic semantics Partition semantics Context sensitivity
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Authors and Affiliations 1. Department of Philosophy Northwestern University Evanston USA