Topoi

, Volume 36, Issue 1, pp 171–181 | Cite as

Choice Points for a Modal Theory of Disjunction

Article
First Online:

Abstract

This paper investigates the prospects for a semantic theory that treats disjunction as a modal operator. Potential motivation for such a theory comes from the way in which modals (and especially, but not exclusively, epistemic modals) embed within disjunctions. After reviewing some of the relevant data, I go on to distinguish a variety of modal theories of disjunction. I analyze these theories by considering pairs of conflicting desiderata, highlighting some of the tradeoffs they must face.

Keywords

Disjunction Epistemic modals Dynamic semantics Partition semantics Context sensitivity 
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Notes

Acknowledgments

For conversations and exchanges, I thank Melissa Fusco, Hanti Lin, Sarah Moss, Daniel Rothschild, Paolo Santorio, Seth Yalcin.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyNorthwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA

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