, Volume 36, Issue 2, pp 273–286 | Cite as

Perception Without Representation? On Travis’s Argument Against the Representational View of Perception

  • Berit Brogaard


In this paper I begin by considering Travis’s main argument against a representational view of experience. I argue that the argument succeeds in showing that representation is not essential to experience. However, I argue that it does not succeed in showing that representation is not an essential component of experience enjoyed by creatures like us. I then provide a new argument for thinking that the perceptual experience of earthly creatures is representational. The view that ensues is compatible with a certain relational view of experience but entails a rejection of representationalism.


Cognitive penetration Naïve realism Perceptual experience Perceptual seemings Representationalism 


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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of MiamiCoral GablesUSA
  2. 2.Southern Society for Philosophy and PsychologyAustinUSA

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