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Topoi

, Volume 36, Issue 2, pp 215–227 | Cite as

The Object View of Perception

  • Bill Brewer
Article

Abstract

We perceive a world of mind-independent macroscopic material objects such as stones, tables, trees, and animals. Our experience is the joint upshot of the way these things are and our route through them, along with the various relevant circumstances of perception; and it depends on the normal operation of our perceptual systems. How should we characterise our perceptual experience so as to respect its basis and explain its role in grounding empirical thought and knowledge? I offered an answer to this question in Perception and its objects (Brewer 2011). Here I aim to clarify some of my central arguments and to develop and defend the position further in the light of subsequent critical discussion.

Keywords

Perception Object View Content View Acquaintance Falsity Generality Determinacy Indistinguishability Degraded acquaintance Hallucinatory projection 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyKing’s College LondonStrand, LondonUK

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