A critical analysis of recent interventionist responses to the causal exclusion problem is presented. It is argued that the response can indeed offer a solution to the problem, but one that is based on renouncing the multiple realizability thesis. The account amounts to the rejection of nonreductive physicalism and would thus be unacceptable to many. It is further shown that if the multiple realizability thesis is brought back in and conjoined with the interventionist notion of causation, inter-level causation is ruled out altogether.
KeywordsCausality Counterfactuals Epiphenomenalism Interactionism Interventionism Nonreductive physicalism
I am grateful to an anonymous referee of Topoi for her critical comments on an earlier version of this article. This study has been financially supported by the Finnish Cultural Foundation and the Waldemar von Frenckell Foundation.
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