Theory and Decision

, Volume 84, Issue 1, pp 83–97 | Cite as

On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency

  • Gustavo Bergantiños
  • Jordi Massó
  • Alejandro Neme
Article
  • 45 Downloads

Abstract

We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also a subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We study the extensions of approval voting, scoring methods and the Condorcet winner to our setting from the point of view of their internal stability and consistency properties.

Keywords

Internal stability Consistency Efficiency Neutrality Anonymity 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Facultade de EconómicasUniversidade de VigoVigoSpain
  2. 2.Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica, Campus UABUniversitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona Graduate School of EconomicsBellaterra (Barcelona)Spain
  3. 3.Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San LuisUniversidad Nacional de San Luis and CONICETSan LuisArgentina

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